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 This dissertation consists of two chapters on labor economics. Despite differentia between 
topics, both share a similar property: causal effects analysis in the presence of unobserved variables.  
 The first chapter examines the effects of China's two-child policy on childbearing, marriage, and 
female labor force participation. Using data from the China Labor-Force Dynamic Survey (CLDS) 
for 2012, 2014 and 2016, it generates three broad results. First, the universal two-child policy had a 
significant positive impact on having a second child during a portion of its phase-in. Second, the two-
child policy did not influence the likelihood of marriage for young people. Third, female labor 
participation increased after the two-child policy, regardless of the number of children. Moreover, 
one child mothers' work hours and participation did not fall relative to other mothers as might be 
expected if employers newly saw one child mothers as less likely to persist in employment because 
of the policy change.  
 The second chapter studies the effects of lender-borrower interactions on the microfinance 
market. Based on data from the Wisconsin Women’s Business Initiative Corporation (WWBIC), we 
analyze the potential influence of training and consulting assistance on the borrowers’ timely 
repayment. Using pooled data of monthly repayment by clients, initial results suggest that increased 
consulting services are associated with a decreased rate of missed payments. After a series of 
robustness tests, including client fixed effects, this relationship remains but only for those with a 




both traditional and IV estimates. The results show that more risky clients respond more to the 
consulting service while consulting services can significantly improve the borrower’s repayment 





© Copyright by Tianfang Li. 2020 




TABLE OF CONTENTS 
LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................................ vii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ............................................................................................................. ix 
Chapter 1 Childbearing, Marriage and Labor Participation: The Two-child Policy in China ........ 1 
1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................................ 1 
2 Background and Hypotheses .............................................................................................................. 3 
3 Data .................................................................................................................................................... 7 
4 Methodology .................................................................................................................................... 10 
4.1 Two-child policy and childbearing ........................................................................................................ 10 
4.2 Two-child policy and marriage ............................................................................................................. 11 
4.3 Two-child policy and female labor participation................................................................................... 12 
5 Results .............................................................................................................................................. 13 
5.1 Two-child policy and childbearing ........................................................................................................ 13 
5.2 Two-child policy and marriage ............................................................................................................. 16 
5.3 Two-child policy and female labor participation................................................................................... 18 
6 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................ 21 
Reference ............................................................................................................................................. 23 
Chapter 1 Figures and Tables .............................................................................................................. 25 
Chapter 2 Ancillary Services and Loan Repayment in Microfinance ........................................... 34 
1 Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 34 
2 Background ...................................................................................................................................... 35 
3 Institutional setting and intervention ................................................................................................ 40 
4 Data and Estimation Methods .......................................................................................................... 42 
4.1 Data description .................................................................................................................................... 42 
4.2 Empirical Strategy ................................................................................................................................ 45 




5.1 Ancillary services and payment performance: Disaggregated data ....................................................... 48 
5.2 Ancillary services and Payment Performance: Aggregated data ........................................................... 53 
5.3 Additional Robustness Results .............................................................................................................. 57 
6 Conclusion and policy implications ................................................................................................. 58 
References ........................................................................................................................................... 60 
Chapter 2 Figures and Tables .............................................................................................................. 62 
Chapter 1 Appendices ................................................................................................................... 75 







LIST OF TABLES 
Chapter 1 
Table 1. 1 When a second child was allowed based on the parent's status .................................................................. 25 
Table 1. 2 Descriptive statistics for married women of childbearing age (18-42) ....................................................... 26 
Table 1. 3 Difference-in-differences (DID) estimates of the effect of policies on the second child (married women, 18 
to 42 years old) .................................................................................................................................................... 27 
Table 1. 4 Difference-in-differences (DID) estimates of the effect of policies on childbirth (married women, 18 to 42 
years old) ............................................................................................................................................................. 28 
Table 1. 5 Probit regressions of the effect of the selective two-child policy in 2013 on married or not (men and women, 
18 to 30 years old) ............................................................................................................................................... 29 
Table 1. 6 Summary statistics of female labor participation variables of married women, 18 to 42 years old ............ 30 
Table 1. 7 Statistical comparisons of married women between 18 and 42 years old with different numbers of children
 ............................................................................................................................................................................. 31 
Table 1. 8 Linear probability estimation of female labor participation of married women, 18 to 42 years old ........... 32 
Table 1. 9 OLS estimation of the extent of labor participation of married women, 18 to 42 years old ....................... 33 
Chapter 1 Appendices 
Table A1. 5 Maternity costs for female employees in China ....................................................................................... 75 
Table A1. 6 Estimate the policy effect on the new childbirth (0 to 1-year-old) by pooled data ................................... 76 
Table A1. 7 Gender of the newborn first child before and after the two-child policy.................................................. 77 
Table A1. 8 Median regression of the extent of labor participation of married women, 18 to 42 years old ................ 78 
Table A1. 9 Linear probability estimation of female labor participation of married women, 18 to 38 years old ........ 79 








Table 2. 1 Statistical summary of characteristics for service participants and non-participants (disaggregated 
performance) ........................................................................................................................................................ 62 
Table 2. 2 Statistical summary of characteristics for service participants and non-participants (aggregated performance)
 ............................................................................................................................................................................. 63 
Table 2. 3 Means and standard deviations of characteristics for High (>620) and Low (≤620) credit score .............. 64 
Table 2. 4 The impact of ancillary service on the monthly payment ........................................................................... 65 
Table 2. 5 The impact of ancillary service on the monthly payment, client fixed effect ............................................. 66 
Table 2. 6 Means and standard deviations of ancillary service hours after the monthly payment ............................... 67 
Table 2. 7 The impact of ancillary service after the last missed-payment on monthly payment.................................. 68 
Table 2. 8 OLS regressions of the impact of ancillary service on MissedPaymentRate .............................................. 69 
Table 2. 9 Margins of Probit regressions of the impact of ancillary service on MissedThreePayments ...................... 70 
Table 2. 10 IV regressions of the impact of ancillary service on MissedPaymentRate ............................................... 71 
Table 2. 11 Probit IV regressions of the impact of ancillary service on MissedThreePayments ................................. 73 
 
Chapter 2 Appendices 
Table A2. 1 Statistical summary of characteristics for service participants and non-participants (disaggregated 
performance) ........................................................................................................................................................ 81 
Table A2. 2 Statistical summary of characteristics for service participants and non-participants (Aggregated 
performance) ........................................................................................................................................................ 82 
Table A2. 3 Means and standard deviations of characteristics for High (>620) and Low(≤620) credit score ............. 83 
Table A2. 4 Monthly payment and ancillary service, OLS, linear terms ..................................................................... 84 
Table A2. 5 Monthly payment and ancillary service, OLS, linear terms, client fixed effect ....................................... 85 
Table A2. 6 OLS regressions (MissedPaymentRate) ................................................................................................... 86 
Table A2. 7 Margins of Probit regressions (MissedThreePayments) ........................................................................... 87 
Table A2. 8 IV regressions (MissedPaymentRate) ...................................................................................................... 88 






 I am grateful for everything my advisors have taught me and for all the times they were right 
beside me when I needed them the most. I am truly blessed and thankful to have wonderful 
advisors. 
 First, I would like to express my deep gratitude to my advisor John Heywood for his 
excellent advice, constant support and encouragement. He has always been my role model, a 
perfect advisor and mentor. He had shown me the right path and helped me to nd my way back 
when I lost my way. I am beyond fortunate to have him as my primary advisor. The dissertation 
could never be completed without his excellent guidance and patience. 
 I am also indebted to my advisors Scott Drewianka, Scott Adams and Itziar Lazkano. They 
were always generous with their time. They have taught me numerous lessons, and I learned 
something new about economics and research methodology every moment that I spent with 
them. Their endless enthusiasm, great insights, and constant efforts always motivated me, and 
their valuable comments and advice highly contributed to developing my research.  
 The research has also benefited from conversations with many other professors and my 
colleagues at University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. I also acknowledge support by UW-








Childbearing, Marriage and Labor Participation: The 
Two-child Policy in China 
1 Introduction 
Recently China relaxed its one-child policy. Over the course of a handful of years, various 
groups of parents were successively allowed a second child. The timing of the rollout was based 
on whether the parents themselves were or were not single-child. Eventually, all parents were 
allowed to have two children by 2015. 
The one-child policy has been of enormous interest to economists, and its relaxation is equally 
interesting. This paper examines the extent to which the number of second children (and children 
more generally) increased as a result of the policy, how the marriage behavior of young people 
changed, and changes in the labor market participation of women.  
It uses three waves of the China Labor Force Dynamic Survey to conduct tests. The tests 
examine three related hypotheses. The first is that parents, indeed, had more children and, 
specifically, were more likely to have a second child following the policy change. The second is 
that to accommodate a likely second child, the marriage took place earlier in life as a result of the 
policy change. The third is that the policy change altered the relative advantage of various women 
in the labor market. Prior to the policy change, it may be the case that women with one child were 
in higher demand because they would not be demanding maternity leave or quitting; employers 
would know they had a more "reliable" employee. After the policy change, women with one child 




of their participation may be diminished as a result of the policy change. 
The results indicate that the universal two-child policy in 2015 significantly increased the 
probability of a group of parents (those where neither parent was themselves a single-child) giving 
birth to a child. Moreover, this group was also significantly more likely to have a second child as 
a result of the policy change when compared to controls for whom the policy did not change their 
ability to have two children. 
In terms of the marriage decision, even though the selective two-child policy in 2013 allowed 
parents who are an only child in their original family to have two children, they did not 
significantly increase their higher marriage rate.  
From the perspective of labor participation, we divide women into three groups according to 
whether they have zero, one, or two children. Compared to the year 2012, the possibility of women 
participating in the labor market has increased significantly, regardless of the number of children 
they have, while there is no significant difference between 2014 and 2016 for all the three groups. 
Among those who have a job, compared to the year 2012, only women with two children have a 
significant decrease in typical working days per month in the year 2016. The typical weekly 
working hours of all the three groups reduced significantly in 2016, while the women with two 
children decreased the most hours. Hence, we cannot observe that the work hours and participation 
of women with one child fell relative to other women after the universal two-child policy. 
In what follows, the next section provides a theoretical background and presents the central 
hypotheses. The third section provides the data of the China Labor Force Dynamic Survey (CLDS). 
The fourth section presents the methodological approach and is followed by the regression results 





2 Background and Hypotheses 
Three separate policy changes relaxed the one-child policy in China. Starting in 2011, two 
children were allowed if both the husband and wife were single-child1 in their original family. 
Starting in 2013, if either the husband or the wife was single-child in their original family, they 
became eligible to have two children.2 Finally, in 2015, two children were permitted for all the 
parents, including those for whom neither parent was a single-child3. Thus, as a consequence of 
these policy changes, the selective two-child policy evolved into the universal two-child policy. 
This process is identified in Table 1.1. 
 
<Insert Table 1.1 here> 
 
The change in policy isolated in Table 1.1 may change behavior in at least three ways that 
we identify as our central hypotheses. 1) Most obviously, the policy may increase the likelihood 
of having a second child. 2) The policy may increase the likelihood of marriage or earlier marriage. 
3) The policy may decrease the likelihood of married women participating in the labor market and 
change the work pattern among women with differing numbers of children. Specifically, after the 
universal two-child policy, those women with one child are able to have a second child and so 
present the employer with a new opportunity for quitting or taking maternity leave as a 
consequence. The policy causes them to appear to be less "reliable" workers. This may put them 
 
1 Single child, or only child is a person with no siblings. 
2 There is modest provincial variation in the exact date during that year as some provinces started the new policies few months in 
advance. 





at a labor market disadvantage relative to the period prior to the policy change. We now turn to 
describe each of these hypotheses in more detail. 
China's strict one-child policy has effectively controlled the birth rate in the last several 
decades (Guo et al., 2018). Under the one-child policy, couples who gave birth to more than one 
child faced enormous fines and penalties and could lose their formal jobs. However, in the process 
of China's gradual change from the one-child policy to the two-child policy, the cost of having a 
second child decreased substantially as these punishments were removed and so families are more 
likely to have a second child than before (Chen 2019; Liu and Liu 2018; Yu, Cao, and Kang 2018). 
This policy effect may also appear as an earlier first birth/ shorter first birth interval. Thus, 
anticipating a second child, couples may move up the birth of their first child. Consequently, the 
period immediately after the policy change may be associated with increased births of both first 
and second children. 
Marriage timing and birth decisions are often linked. Jones et al. (2009) suggest in a study 
of East Asian countries that low fertility rates in East Asian countries are associated with delayed 
marriage. In China, the low fertility rate is related to economic development and the strict fertility 
policies, including a minimum age for marriage (22 years for men and 20 years for women) and 
the one-child policy. Ye (1992) confirmed that China's one-child fertility policy effectively delayed 
the age of first marriage. However, the impact of marriage delay on fertility has been reduced by 
the accelerated birth or shorter first birth interval after marriage. Huang and Zhou (2015) show 
that the one-child policy has also significantly increased the unmarried rate4. Thus, we anticipate 
that as the two-child policy replaces the one-child policy, the expected number of children in the 
 




family may increase. As a consequence, couples may need or wish to give birth to the first child 
earlier to allow time for the birth of the second child. In turn, this may make the average age of 
marriage younger and may even increase the probability of marriage. 
The two-child policy may affect family fertility decisions, which in turn affects women’s labor 
force participation (Cooke 2017). The increase in the number of children in the family may affect 
women’s labor supply in different ways. On the one hand, as the home production load increases, 
women with more children need to increase their home hours and shorten their paid work and/or 
leisure time (He and Zhu 2016). Moreover, studies show that different numbers of children have 
different effects on female labor participation. Women with more than two children are much more 
likely to exit from the labor market (Doren 2019). Many studies show that as the number of young 
children in the family increase, mothers are less likely to participate in the labor market and work 
fewer hours if they do (Angrist and Evans 1996; Doren 2019). Moreover, women tend to choose 
more flexible work hours and in order to fulfill childcare duties. Yet, Ngo's (2020) research on 
Vietnam points out that the impact of the number of children on female labor participation is related 
to a women’s age and education. Only young and highly educated women have a significantly 
lower probability of participating in work when the number of children increases. Nonetheless, the 
advent of more second children may decrease labor force participation and work hours of women.5 
On the other hand, women with more children need to increase market labor time to earn more 
money due to higher living costs associated with additional children. The housework generated by 
more children is typically solved in China through the intergenerational transfer of labor. 
Grandparents help take care of the children (Guo et al., 2018; Posadas and Vidal-Fernandez, 2013; 
 
5 From the female employee side, the closer the employment interruption, the less worthwhile are investments in increasing 
human capital. Therefore, even before a child is born, women expecting a career interruption may choose not leave the labor 




Yu et al., 2018), allowing the mother to return to work with perhaps even greater intensity.  
There may, however, be more subtle influences on the demand side. After the universal two-
child policy, gender discrimination in the labor market has become more serious. It was observed 
that after the universal two-child policy, in the job fairs in China, women with one child were not 
as competitive as those with two children or as competitive as they would have been before the 
two-child policy. The possible explanation is that under the new universal two-child policy, women 
who have no children or have one child are more likely to have maternity leave than women who 
already have two children. From the employer's side, the cost of hiring a woman who will have 
maternity leave or quit in the future is relatively high6. Critically, in China, the cost to the employer 
of such leaves is not fully compensated for by the government maternity insurance. These 
payments fall far below the employer's costs. Thus, women who have two children are now thought 
to be unlikely to generate maternity costs are preferred by position formerly reserved for those 
with one child.  
These observations from the press in China hint at this issue. The Yangzi Evening News (2016) 
wrote that “[A]fter the two-child policy, SMEs7 ‘upgraded’ the unspoken rules that give priority 
to ‘married and childbearing’ women to give priority now to ‘married, two children’ women.” 
Similarly, Bond Times (2015) wrote that employers “not prepared for the two-child policy had 
intensified gender discrimination against those not yet with two children.” Again, such 
observations hint that women who previously had one child were advantaged in employers' eyes 
but lost that when a second child was allowed by the policy change. 
Based on these thoughts, the policy change may be reflected in reduced labor force 
 
6 As shown in Table A1.1. 




participation, attachment, or hours for women with one child. They lost their advantage in the eyes 
of employers relative to women without children. Moreover, women with two children might be 
anticipated to now appear to be the most “reliable” employees. Thus, our central hypotheses are 
that the two-child policy should increase the number of second children (and perhaps first children 
due to timing), lower the age of marriage (or increase its likelihood), and reduce the relative labor 
market participation and attachment of women who have one child when compared to those with 
no child or two children. 
 
3 Data 
We use three repeated cross-sections in our paper. They are from the nationally representative 
China Labor Force Dynamic Survey (CLDS) for 2012, 2014, and 2016, sponsored by the Center 
for Social Survey at Sen Yat-sen University and included in the Chinese social science survey 
platform. It covered 29 out of 31 province-level administrative areas of mainland China and was 
sampled by a multi-stage stratified sampling method (Gong, Luo, and Ling, 2016; Liu and Liu, 
2018; Wang, Zhou, and Liu, 2017). The three waves include separate family and individual 
variables, including marital status, age, labor market participation, income, labor mobility. We 
merge the family and individual questionnaires to pair the female-related individual data with the 
information of their spouse and family structure.  
As we investigate three issues, there are three sets of dependent variables. First, we examine 
the childbearing behavior of women. To do this, we create the dependent variables to show whether 
there is a child born after each of the successive two-child policies. Since the survey is conducted 




the relevant policy change.8 The critical independent variables are policy dummies and their 
interaction with the treated group associated with each policy change, which is determined by 
parents’ status, as described in Table 1.1. Controls include the presence of senior family members 
(grandparents), family income, first child gender (depending on specification), whether the family 
location is rural or urban, and the women’s age, education and health self-evaluation. 
Second, we investigate marriage behavior. Here the dependent variable we use is simply 
married or not. The sample is young men and women between 18 and 30 years old in the year 2014 
survey. The policy dummy here is the 2013 policy. Other control variables are similar to the above. 
Critically, we recognize that different potential marriages could be influenced by the policy 
changes given the status of both the individual and their potential spouse, as identified in Table 1.1. 
Thus, we examine the 2013 policy for young men and women who are single-child in their original 
family. This policy change means that regardless of the status of their spouse, they will be able to 
have a second child. Prior to this, such a person could only have a second child is if they married 
another person who was also a single child. 
Third, we create three labor participation variables from the survey. First, we simply examine 
whether or not the respondent worked in the last year. If they have worked, we examine two 
measures of intensity of participation. The first of those measures identifies how many days they 
usually work in a month. The second measures how many hours they typically work per week. 
This variety gives us ample opportunity to see whether women’s labor force participation changed 
in response to the universal two-child policy introduction. 
Critical controls include the daily wage in Chinese Yuan (Wage (Yuan/Day)), which is 
generated by total annual labor income divided by the total days she worked last year. This variable 
 




has a history of use in Chinese labor market studies. The average daily income is 151 Yuan, which 
is about $21. We also imputed the missing wages for women not working by using the personal 
characters, including education, work experience, age, health status and region. The education 
years variable is calculated by the highest degree and education history. Generally, China’s 
education system is six years in elementary school, three years in junior high school, three years 
in high school/vocational high school, four years in undergraduate, two or three years in 
postgraduate, and more than three years in doctor. Potential work experience is calculated by using 
age minus education years minus six years old9. Other family member income is the difference 
between the total annual family income and individual yearly total income. The first child gender 
is 1(one) if the first child in the family is a boy. 
Table 1.2 shows the descriptive statistics of childbearing age taken to be 18 to 42.10 We will 
also explore a younger age range of 18 to 38. The sample consists of relatively fewer single-child 
parents. Indeed, the share of families with one or both single-child parents is 13%, 15% and 17% 
over the three years. One single-child parents accounted for 9%, 11%, and 12% of the three-year 
sample, respectively. Both single-child parents have the smallest percentages, at 4% in the year 
2012 and 2014, and 5% in 2016. These relatively small numbers may reflect both the timing of the 
one-child policy and the success of its enforcement. Thus, parents where neither were single-child 
in their original family are older. 
 
<Insert Table 1.2 about here> 
 
 
9 Minimum age for employment is 16 years old. 
10 Other sources use 15-49 years old as the childbearing age range. The combination of Chinese law on underage birth and the 




The data also shows that families where one or both parents were single-child in their original 
family, have higher household income, a greater proportion live in an urban area, and fewer 
children in the household. Finally, comparing the number of children in families in different years, 
we can find that the average number of children in the family follows the same trend for all parents. 
The number of children increased from 2012 to 2014 and then decreased in 2016. 
 
4 Methodology 
As we have three related hypotheses, we will briefly explain our approach to testing each 
separately. 
4.1 Two-child policy and childbearing  
We use a difference-in-difference (DID) method to estimate the coefficients of the fertility 
policy on whether there is a newborn child in the family after the policies. Since CLDS does not 
have the data before the first selective two-child policy in 2011 (which allowed families where 
both parents were single children to have a second child), we can only use a DID method to analyze 
the two subsequent policies in the year 2013 and 2015. 
To evaluate the impact of the 2013 policy (which allowed families in which one parent was a 
single child to have a second child), we use the data of all three years, 2012, 2014, and 2016. The 
treated group is the families newly allowed a second child in 2013. The policy period is 2014 and 
2016. The control group is the families where both parents were single children who had been 
allowed a second child throughout our observation period. 
When estimating the universal two-child policy in 2015, we again use the data for all three 
years, 2012, 2014, and 2016. The treated group is the families where neither parent was a single 




period now is only 2016.  
 
4.2 Two-child policy and marriage 
In the analysis above, our research object is the childbearing of married women. Nevertheless, 
the two-child policy may influence marriage decisions at the same time. Young people who can 
now have two children may decide to marry earlier. Indeed, if this influence is large enough, the 
pool of married people in the earlier analysis could substantially grow. If the newly married people 
are relatively less likely to have children immediately, this could even bias down the share of 
married people having children following the policy changes. 
To examine whether the two-child policy influenced marriage decisions, we estimate whether 
or not the marriage rate increased after the policies were implemented. Finding appropriate 
treatment and control is complicated because of the variety of potential marriage partners. In short, 
the single-child status of a potential spouse influences whether or not one would anticipate an 
earlier marriage. The cleanest test we could think of uses data in the years 2012 and 2014. The 
sample consists of young people between 18 and 30 years old. Within this sample, the treated 
group are individuals who are themselves single-child. As a single child, the policy change in 2013 
newly allows him/her to have a second child regardless of whom he/she marries. This was not true 
prior to that policy change. The control group is those in the sample who have siblings. This group 
is limited to finding a spouse who is a single child if they wish to have a second child once married. 
They hypothesize is that those for whom any spouse will allow a second child are more likely to 





4.3 Two-child policy and female labor participation 
To explore how the married childbearing age women’s labor market participation varies by 
the number of children, we estimate the following model separately by the number of children that 
the women have, zero, one or two. 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝑋𝑖𝑡β + 1{𝑡 = 2014}𝛾1 + 1{𝑡 = 2016}𝛾2 + 𝑖𝑡 
In the equation, 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is the employment status of specific women in one of our three years. It 
is proxied with the dummy variable indicating whether or not she has worked for money in the last 
year.11 If the answer is yes, we then estimate variants of the equation that measure the typical 
working days per month and the typical working hours per week. These measure the intensity of 
participation. Individual and household socioeconomic characteristics are in 𝑋𝑖𝑡 . Individual 
variables are age, education, health status, and wage. Household variables are the number of 
preschool-age children in the family, other family member income, and family locates in a rural 
area or not. The wage rate of women who are not involved in the labor market cannot be observed. 
So we impute the missing values of daily wages. The regressors of imputed wages are experience, 
education, living in an urban or rural area, health self-evaluation, marital status, number of children, 
communist or democratic party member. Possible experience is age minus education years.12  
If hypothesis 3 holds, the pattern of coefficients on the period dummies should look different 
for women with one child. They should lose their favored status of being more “reliable” in the 
employer's eyes relative to those with no children, who might always be viewed as less reliable 
and relative to those with two children who will now be viewed as the more reliable. Thus, there 
should be declines over time in the participation and intensity of participation for one child mothers 
 
11 The timing of the survey and the dates of the policy announcement make it possible that in some cases a women may have 
worked prior to the announcement but within the year. This obviously introduces measurement error if she withdrew in response 
to the announcement and yet would still be included as working. 




relative to other women. 
 
5 Results 
We now turn to the results of testing each of the three related hypotheses. 
 
5.1 Two-child policy and childbearing  
Table 1.3 shows the results when the dependent variable is whether or not the family had a 
second child after the policy. The OLS models with control variables in columns 3 and 4 have 
better r-squared than the models in columns 1 and 2 without control variables.13 According to the 
coefficients on the control variables, younger people and those with higher education are more 
likely to give birth to a child after the 2013 selective two-child policy. In terms of the 2015 
universal two-child policy, women with more education and those living with seniors 
(grandparents) are more likely to have a newborn after the policy. Other control variables do not 
typically have significant effects.  
Column 3 shows examine the influence of the 2013 policy that allowed those with one single 
parent in their original families to have a second child. The control is families with two single 
parents in their original families as these families were allowed a second child throughout the 
sample period. The probability of newborns in all the families decreased by 16.5% in the years 
after the policy. The coefficient on the difference-in-difference term Policy2013* one single-child 
is not statistically different from zero. This shows that the treatment group (families with one 
single-child parent) did not significantly increase their births relative to the control group (both 
single-child parents) after the policy change. 
 
13 None of the critical results shown in this subsection vary in general size or statistical significance if they are estimated using 




Column 4 examines the universal two-child policy in 2015 that allowed those with no single 
children in their original families to have a second child. Again, this treatment group is compared 
to two single-child parents who were allowed a second child through the sample period. The results 
show a decreasing tendency to have children with time. The treated group also has significantly 
fewer newborns, as would be anticipated as families in the control group who have been allowed 
to have two children for some time. The difference-in-difference term shows a significant and 
positive effect on the probability of having a child. This shows that families in which neither parent 
was a single-child (the group influenced by the 2015 change) were more likely to have a second 
child within the months after the policy change relative to the control, families eligible to have two 
children throughout our sample period. The average increase in the probability of having a second 
child within one year after the 2015 policy change is 13.6% in this treated group relative to the 
control. This is a substantial as well as a statistically significant increase. 
 
<Insert Table 1.3 about here> 
 
We also tried to pool all the data to measure the impact of the two-child policy as a whole on 
having a second child. This model includes parental type fixed effects and year fixed effects in 
order to focus on the policy. The policy variable takes the value of 1 (one) for all three years for 
families with two single-child parents. It takes a 0 (zero) in the first year and 1 (one) in the next 
two years for families with one single-child parent. It takes a zero for the first two years and one 
for the last year for those without a single-child parent. The result in Table A2 shows insignificant 
policy variables. This suggests that the policy influence is limited to the result isolated in Table 3. 




the policy. The substantial increase in the second child for the both single-child parents group 
might hide an influence on hurrying to have a first child. To reflect this influence, we now turn to 
examine the influence of the policy on both first and second children. 
Table 1.4 estimates the policy impact on a new birth in the family after the policy. This child 
can be either a first or second child. The sample was expanded to families with one child or no 
children before the two-child policy. Again, we anticipate both a direct influence on having a 
second child and also that the two-child policies may also impact first birth patterns for families 
without any children. When families expect to have two children instead of one, the plan to have 
the first child may be advanced to allow time for the second.  
It follows from an expanded estimation from Table 1.3. The added independent variables are 
the interaction of the difference-in-difference variable with whether or not the family has one child 
not born in the last year. Adding this variable means that the original coefficient on the difference-
in-difference variable influences having a first child, and the sum of the coefficient on that original 
interaction and the new interaction is the influence on having a second child.  
 
<Insert Table 1.4 about here> 
 
Table 1.4 shows that both the two-child policies in 2013 and 2015 significantly impacted the 
new births. Both regressions without and with control variables have the same signs of coefficients, 
but the latter regressions have the better adjusted R2.  
According to the third regression in Table 1.4, one single-child parent families are 40.9% more 
likely to have their first child right after the 2013 policy change than both single-child parent 




significant. Again, this may reflect a moving up of the first birth to accommodate an eventual 
second birth. 
In the fourth column, the treated group of families where neither parent is a single-child can 
be contrasted with the control of families where both parents were single children. The treated 
group is 30.7% more likely to have their first child. However, the policy effect on giving birth to 
the second child right after the policy is not significant. 
Based on these results, we believe that the two-child policies have significantly impacted 
family birth decisions. In both policy experiments, we found an increased probability of first 
childbirth for the treated group. This suggests that the policies pushed up the timing of the first 
child likely in anticipation of a second child. The 2015 policy change had an independent influence 
that increased the probability of having a second child. This is the direct result anticipated given 
the policy, and its magnitude is large. We recognize these are relatively short term results given 
the nature of the data, and additional testing is warranted to find longer-term responses. 
Nonetheless, just as implementing the one-child policy was found to reduce childbirths, the early 
indications are that relaxing the one-child policy with a two-child policy has increased childbirths. 
 
5.2 Two-child policy and marriage 
Table 1.5 shows the estimation results of whether the selective two-child policy that began in 
2013 has an impact on whether young people get married or not. Since 2013, only if one of the 
couples is single-child they can have two children. So we treat young people14 who are single-
child as the treatment group and those with siblings as the control group. If the policy impacts 
marriage decisions, then the single-child people in 2014 are more likely to be married than in 2012. 
 




The sample includes young people in the year 2012 and 2014 between the ages of 18 and 30, which 
is the first marriage age range for most people. The dependent variable is a dummy variable, so we 
use probit regression and also use OLS regression as a reference. All regression coefficients are 
marginal effects. 
The regression results in the first two columns include only the key independent variables, 
policy year, whether the respondent is single-child, and the interaction term of the policy year and 
single-child (Policy2013* Single-Child). On average, the sample population had a 2% lower 
marriage rate in 2014 than in 2012, while the single-child young people's marriage rate was 1.1% 
lower than that of non-single-child. However, the coefficient of Policy2013* Single-Child is not 
significant, i.e., the effect of the two-child policy in 2013 on the single-child marriage possibility 
is not significant. 
The third and fourth regressions include not only policy-related variables but also other control 
variables that affect marital status: gender, age, education, and whether or not living in rural areas. 
After adding control variables, pseudo R2 has been improved. According to the regression results, 
younger people, people with higher education and are urban areas citizens are less likely to be 
married. Without Single-Child and Policy2013*Single-Child variables, the policy year variable 
coefficient is significantly negative; specifically, the probability of getting married in 2014 is 5% 
lower than that in 2012. However, when we add treatment group and policy variables into the 
model, the coefficients of policy-related variables are no longer significant. Therefore, it cannot 
be verified that the two-child policy has an impact on fertility decisions. 15 
 
 
15 This conclusion prevents a potential bias in estimating the impact of the two-child policy on fertility. If we assume that newly 
married people are less likely to have children immediately, then when the two-child policy leads to an increase in newly married 
women, the impact of the policy on fertility will be underestimated. However, in this article, because policy changes did not 




<Insert Table 1.5 about here> 
 
5.3 Two-child policy and female labor participation 
Table 1.6 and Table 1.7 show statistical descriptions of the variables of female labor market 
participation. The sample is 18 to 42 years old married women. Women who worked since last 
year account for 82% of the sample. Among those who had a job, they worked on average 24 
days per month and 38 hours per week. There are the fewest observations for married women 
without children (zero-child women) in our sample. Generally, women without children have 
higher labor participation and longer work hours. Women with one child have the highest daily 
wage, 169 yuan/day. The average education years for women with two children is 7.8 years, 
which is much lower than the other two groups, which exceeds ten years. 
 
<Insert Table 1.6 about here> 
<Insert Table 1.7 about here> 
 
Table 1.8 estimates the labor participation of women with different numbers of children in 
different years. This estimation is a linear probability model. For all the groups, women with a 
college degree are more likely to have been working in the previous year. From the regression 
results, the higher the wage/imputed wage, the more likely women are not to work. Moreover, 
compared with 2012, the likelihood of employment in 2014 and 2016 increased significantly. 
An imperfect sense of the universal two-child policy in 2015 on female labor participation 
can be seen by comparing the coefficients of time dummies for 2014 and 2016. These two values 




near statistical significance.  
The significant patterns in labor force participation come from comparing 2012 with either 
2014 or 2016. For all groups of women, labor force participation increased. It increased most for 
the women with two children, 0.25, perhaps because they became to be viewed as the most 
reliable. The next largest increase was, however, for those with one child, 0.22. This does not 
seem consistent with the idea that they suddenly became markedly less reliable. One would 
anticipate their labor force participation decrease or at least increase the least. The smallest 
increase is for women without children, 0.15. These women would have always been viewed as 
unreliable. However, it seems that a young woman with zero child has perhaps resulted in them 
viewed as relatively even less reliable. 
While late in life, births may be unlikely, they could represent influential observations. 
Perhaps employers feel the younger group may be particularly responsive to policy changes. As a 
robustness check, a sample of women 18 to 38 was examined. As Appendix Table A1.4 and 
Table A1.5 show, there remains no support for the hypothesis that women with one child have 
become disadvantaged as a result of the policies.  
 
<Insert Table 1.8 about here> 
 
In addition to the extensive margin, we estimate the intensive participation margin. The 
sample in Table 1.9 consists of women 18 to 42 years old who have worked in the past year, and 
the dependent variables are typical working days per month and the usual working hours per 
week in a recent job.  




children did not have significant change across the three years. The workdays for women with 
one child increased by 0.71 in 2014, but this increase vanished in 2016. Women with two 
children worked fewer days in both 2014 and 2016 than 2012 with the entire declining being 
about 1.34 day per month. This presents a complicated picture of women with two children 
having both the largest increase in simple participation but a decline in days per month. 
 
<Insert Table 1.9 here> 
 
The working hours per week shows a general downward trend. The overall declines from 
2012 to 2016 are 6.4 hours for women with no children, 4.7 hours for women with one-child and 
7.4 hours for women with two children. All of these declines are statistically significant. This 
pattern is particularly hard to reconcile with employers being reluctant to hire and give full-time 
hours to women with one child. In a period of declining hours of work for women, the decline 
for women with one child appears the smallest. 
In a robustness check, median regression was estimated. The concern is that the typical point 
of means associated with regression might not be representative. Yet, the estimates in Table A3 
remain consistent with the original regressions in Table 1.9. The first three columns show that the 
timing of the universal two-child policy did not significantly decrease the usual monthly 
workdays of women with one child. The second three columns also mimic the original 
regressions by showing that the working hours per week generally decline for all women over 
the time window. Moreover, the decline for women with one child is smaller than that for women 
with two children. On balance, there continues to be no evidence of the employer behavior 




employment workdays or hours. 
In short, neither the participation decision nor the extent of participation provides support for 
their hypothesis that employers will change their beliefs about the reliability of women with one 
child. Again, it is particularly hard to tie the estimation to the exact policy year changes as the 
employers know how many children a female applicant or employee has but do not know the 
single child status of the applicant and her spouse. Thus, the test is simply one of the evolution 
patterns as it becomes the case that more women, and eventually, all women, can have a second 
child. 
 
6 Conclusion  
This paper focused on the behavioral responses of women to the relaxing of China's one-child 
policy and its replacement with an eventually universal two-child policy. It examined married 
women’s childbearing decisions, young people's marriage decisions and women's labor 
participation under the policy change. In each, the object was to see if a behavioral response could 
be tied to the timing of the role out of the two-child policy. 
Perhaps the most dramatic results were on fertility. Both the two-child policies in 2013 and 
2015 increased the probability of having children in the short term immediately after the policy. In 
2013 it seemed to be an influence on only first children. Nevertheless, the 2015 policy was also 
associated with a significantly increased probability that families, where neither parent was a 
single-child, had a second child. This was compared to the control of families where both parents 
were single-child. The control group was allowed to have a second child throughout the sample 
period. 




policy that allowed families with one single-child parent to have two children happened in 2013, 
but it did not significantly increase the probability of marriage for young people who were a single 
child. This group we suspected would be most influenced as following 2013, and they were 
allowed to have a second child regardless of the status of their spouse.  No influence on marriage 
age or likelihood was found. 
Finally, in the process of gradually changing from the one-child policy to the two-child policy, 
women with one child may have been perceived as increasingly unreliable. They became eligible 
for maternity leave and long absences that would not have been associated with women with a 
single child before the policy. While employers typically know the number of children of their 
applicants, they do not know whether the employees are eligible for the "selective two-child 
policy". Thus, it was anticipated that over the course of the three waves, employers would reduce 
the hiring hours of women with one child, relative to either no children mothers (always less 
reliable) or two children mothers (who would be anticipated to have no more children). We could 
not find that the labor participation nor the labor attachment influenced in a fashion consistent with 
this hypothesis. 
Future work could be improved by access to fully longitudinal data that followed women year 
by year rather than this paper's use of a repeated cross-section. Also, knowing the exact working 
dates of women within each year and the exact dates of the birth of their children would allow a 
better match between the policy dates and the critical dependent variables.  Nonetheless, the 
finding that the two-child policy appears to have significantly increased childbirth stands as a 
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Chapter 1 Figures and Tables 
 
Table 1. 1 When a second child was allowed based on the parent's status 
 Both parents single-child One parent a single-child  Neither parent a single-child  
2011  Two children One child One child 
2013  Two children Two children One child 









Table 1. 2 Descriptive statistics for married women of childbearing age (18-42) 
Neither single-child parents                  
 2012  2014  2016 
 Mean Sd  Mean Sd  Mean Sd 
Age 34.34  5.73   34.65  5.70   34.55  5.67  
Edu years 9.49  3.70   9.07  3.97   9.18  3.93  
52 to 69 years old family member (dummy) 0.18  0.38   0.33  0.47   0.32  0.47  
Family income (yuan) 48636  47874   63134  73175   69965  82044  
Location (rural=1, urban=0) 0.55  0.50   0.58  0.49   0.57  0.50  
Number of children 1.37  0.57   1.46  0.53   1.42  0.60  
N 1288      1612      1344    
One single-child parents         
 2012  2014  2016 
 Mean Sd  Mean Sd  Mean Sd 
Age 31.15  5.13   34.01  5.22   32.81  5.45  
Edu years 11.56  3.84   11.18  4.24   11.90  3.97  
52 to 69 years old family member (dummy) 0.19  0.40   0.33  0.47   0.31  0.46  
Family income (yuan) 64687  68073   89587  152693   105560  122373  
Location (rural=1, urban=0) 0.39  0.49   0.38  0.49   0.31  0.46  
Number of children 1.01  0.59   1.20  0.44   1.13  0.61  
N 134      214      186    
Both single-child parents         
 2012  2014  2016 
 Mean Sd  Mean Sd  Mean Sd 
Age 30.48  4.91   32.62  4.40   31.80  4.77  
Edu years 13.13  3.63   12.69  3.27   13.22  3.77  
52 to 69 years old family member (dummy) 0.21  0.41   0.27  0.45   0.21  0.41  
Family income (yuan) 85553  70241   92639  88441   150049  208779  
Location (rural=1, urban=0) 0.19  0.40   0.25  0.44   0.16  0.37  
Number of children 0.73  0.60   1.13  0.44   0.91  0.66  






Table 1. 3 Difference-in-differences (DID) estimates of the effect of policies on the second child (married women, 18 to 42 
years old) 
Policy 2013 2015  2013 2015 
Treatment group 1 single-child 0 single-child   1 single-child  0 single-child  
Control group 2 single-child  2 single-child   2 single-child  2 single-child  
Policy2013 -0.141**   -0.165**  
 (0.0673)   (0.0771)  
Policy2015  -0.154***   -0.146** 
  (0.0505)   (0.0606) 
One single-child parents -0.117*   -0.118  
 (0.0680)   (0.0790)  
Neither single-child parents  -0.156***   -0.151*** 
  (0.0391)   (0.0432) 
Policy2013* one single-child parents 0.0895   0.0937  
 (0.0759)   (0.0873)  
Policy2016* neither single-child parents  0.145***   0.136** 
  (0.0514)   (0.0611) 
Control variables      
Age    -0.963*** -0.0647 
    (0.0651) (0.308) 
Age groups (3 years)      
Age*age groups (3 years)      
Edu years    0.00146 0.00453*** 
    (0.00650) (0.00147) 
Edu years*collegesome    0.00748** 0.0000272 
    (0.00320) (0.00110) 
52 to 69 years old family member (dummy)    -0.0136 0.0232** 
    (0.0299) (0.0113) 
Family income (yuan)    -7.99e-08 -0.000000119 
    (8.49e-08) (7.38e-08) 
Location_rural    -0.0237 0.00807 
    (0.0331) (0.0103) 
First child gender (1=boy, 0=girl)    0.00601 -0.0138 
    (0.0280) (0.00902) 
Cons 0.286*** 0.244***  19.44*** 2.015 
 (0.0605) (0.0387)  (1.293) (6.085) 
N 715 4192  592 3761 
Adj. R2 0.012 0.008  0.239 0.164 
Notes: The dependent variable is the presence of a newborn, identified by a child less than one year old in the household. We use 
the data of all three years, 2012, 2014 and 2016. 
Standard errors in parentheses 






Table 1. 4 Difference-in-differences (DID) estimates of the effect of policies on childbirth (married women, 18 to 42 years 
old) 
Dependent variable Any child age <1 
Policy 2013 2015  2013 2015 
Treatment group 1 single-child 0 single-child   1 single-child  0 single-child  
Control group 2 single-child  2 single-child   2 single-child  2 single-child  
Policy2013 -0.138*   -0.161*  
 (0.0713)   (0.0856)  
Policy2015  -0.159***   -0.119* 
  (0.0557)   (0.0694) 
One single-child parents -0.103   -0.122  
 (0.0727)   (0.0877)  
Neither single-child parents  -0.123***   -0.130*** 
  (0.0421)   (0.0471) 
Policy2013* one single-child parents 0.293***   0.409***  
 (0.0995)   (0.117)  
Policy2015* neither single-child parents  0.263***   0.303*** 
  (0.0659)   (0.0810) 
Policy2013*one single-child *child before 2013 -0.268***   -0.371***  
 (0.0623)   (0.0633)  
Policy2015*neither single-child * child before 2015  -0.146***   -0.222*** 
  (0.0365)   (0.0427) 
Linear combinations of parameters           
Policy2013; one single-child; second child 0.025   0.038  
 (0.082)   (0.098)  
Policy2015; neither single-child; second child  0.117*   0.081 
  (0.058)   (0.071) 
Control variables           
Age    -0.0369 0.238 
    (0.0247) (0.311) 
Age groups (3 years)    Yes Yes 
Age*age groups (3 years)    Yes Yes 
Edu years    -0.00121 0.00298 
    (0.0102) (0.00315) 
Edu years*collegesome    0.00612 -0.000902 
    (0.00418) (0.00156) 
52 to 69 years old family member (dummy)    -0.0190 0.0278* 
    (0.0351) (0.0169) 
Family income (yuan)    -4.48e-08 -0.000000132 
    (0.000000104) (0.000000119) 
Location_rural    -0.00334 0.0376** 
    (0.0405) (0.0164) 
First child gender (1=boy, 0=girl)    0.00356 -0.0540*** 
    (0.0318) (0.0151) 
Cons 0.302*** 0.263***  1.849*** -3.865 
 (0.0633) (0.0413)  (0.464) (6.172) 
N 606 2568  492 2258 
Adj. R2 0.050 0.013   0.290 0.206 
 Standard errors in parentheses 





Table 1. 5 Probit regressions of the effect of the selective two-child policy in 2013 on married or not (men and women, 18 
to 30 years old) 
Policy 2013 
Data 2012, 2014 
Treatment group Single-child 
Control group Not single-child 
Policy2013 -0.0208* 0.00446   -0.0510*** -0.0142 
 (0.0112) (0.0377)  (0.00803) (0.0320) 
Single-child  -0.108*   -0.0349 
  (0.0576)   (0.0493) 
Policy2013* single-child  0.00285   0.0157 
 
 (0.0708)   (0.0587) 
Control variables           
Gender    -0.159*** 0.0618** 
 
  
 (0.00707) (0.0264) 
Age    0.0587*** 0.0688*** 
 
  
 (0.00476) (0.0166) 
Age groups (3 years)    Yes Yes 
Age*age groups (3 years)    Yes Yes 
      
Edu years    -0.0159*** -0.0229** 
 
  
 (0.00200) (0.00904) 
Edu years*collegesome    -0.00732*** -0.00122 
 
  
 (0.000893) (0.00365) 
Location_rural    0.0610*** 0.145*** 
 
  
 (0.00790) (0.0303) 






N 9366 1034  9352 1033 
Pseudo R2 0.000 0.007   0.425 0.263 
Standard errors in parentheses 






Table 1. 6 Summary statistics of female labor participation variables of married women, 18 to 42 years old 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
Worked since last year 4,933 0.82 0.39 
Usual Work days/month 4,005 24  7  
Usual hours/week 4,918 38  26  
Wage (yuan/day) 3,980 122  234  
Imputed wage (yuan/day) 4,415 151  634  
Edu years 5,345 9.67 3.93 
Collegesome 5,345 0.2 0.4 
Age 5,521 34.19 5.67 
Health 5,520 3.27 1.18 
Family member income 4,381 41621  71992  
Preschool children at home 5,521 0.4 0.58 
Location_rural (rural=1, urban=0) 5,517 0.55 0.5 
Year 2014 5,521 0.36 0.48 
Year 2016 5,521 0.31 0.46 
One child 5,521 0.53 0.5 
Two child 5,521 0.41 0.49 
Senior age 52 to 69 (dummy) 5,521 0.49 0.78 
First child gender (1=boy, 0=girl) 5,190 0.55 0.5 
Farming 5,521 0.35 0.48 









Table 1. 7 Statistical comparisons of married women between 18 and 42 years old with different numbers of children 
  Zero child     One child       Two children   
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev.  Obs Mean Std. Dev.  Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
Worked since last year 270 0.86 0.35  2,658 0.83 0.38  2,005 0.79 0.41 
Usual Work days/month 231 24  5   2,195 24  6   1,579 24  7  
Usual hours/week 270 39  21   2,649 38  25   1,999 38  29  
Wage (yuan/day) 229 157  171   2,180 139  230   1,571 93  244  
Imputed wage (yuan/day) 232 141  265   2,419 169  649   1,764 127  647  
Edu years 296 12.31 3.85  2,888 10.78 3.74  2,161 7.83 3.39 
Collegesome 296 0.47 0.5  2,888 0.28 0.45  2,161 0.05 0.21 
Age 302 29.77 5.55  2,946 33.99 5.61  2,273 35.05 5.46 
Health 302 3.04 1.29  2,946 3.34 1.16  2,272 3.21 1.18 
Family member income 248 51998  77215   2,365 46482  78254   1,768 33663  60916  
Preschool children at home 302 0.04 0.25  2,946 0.33 0.5  2,273 0.52 0.68 
Location_rural (rural=1, urban=0) 302 0.3 0.46  2,942 0.43 0.49  2,273 0.74 0.44 
Year 2014 302 0.11 0.31  2,946 0.38 0.48  2,273 0.37 0.48 
Year 2016 302 0.5 0.5  2,946 0.29 0.45  2,273 0.32 0.47 
One child 302 0 0  2,946 1 0  2,273 0 0 
Two child 302 0 0  2,946 0 0  2,273 1 0 
Senior age 52 to 69 (dummy) 302 0.4 0.74  2,946 0.5 0.79  2,273 0.5 0.77 
First child gender (1=boy, 0=girl)     2,936 1 0  2,254 0 1 
Farming 302 0 0  2,946 0 0  2,273 1 1 







Table 1. 8 Linear probability estimation of female labor participation of married women, 18 to 42 years old 
  Zero child One child Two children 
Wage (1000 yuan/day) 0.00543 0.0106 0.0215 
 (0.0625) (0.0188) (0.0241) 
Wage square -0.00924 -0.0604*** -0.0583*** 
 (0.0219) (0.00819) (0.0105) 
Edu years -0.0133 -0.000197 0.00116 
 (0.0114) (0.00208) (0.00178) 
Collegesome 0.179** 0.0542*** 0.0455** 
 (0.0747) (0.0150) (0.0206) 
Age 0.0674 0.0290** 0.000718 
 (0.0441) (0.0137) (0.0140) 
Age_sq -0.00102 -0.000423** 0.0000138 
 (0.000691) (0.000198) (0.000203) 
Health 0.0107 0.00424 -0.00685 
 (0.0174) (0.00608) (0.00669) 
Family member income -0.0193 -0.00997* -0.0218*** 
 (0.0181) (0.00536) (0.00606) 
Preschool children at home 0.0105 -0.0458*** -0.0359*** 
 (0.0318) (0.0140) (0.0134) 
Location_rural (rural=1, urban=0) -0.0244 0.0116 -0.0154 
 (0.0401) (0.0116) (0.0147) 
Year2014 0.153*** 0.172*** 0.219*** 
 (0.0417) (0.0134) (0.0208) 
Year2016 0.151*** 0.173*** 0.201*** 
 (0.0539) (0.0174) (0.0221) 
Year2016-year2014 -0.002 0.014 -0.018 
 (0.043) (0.011) (0.012) 
_cons 0.0275 0.432* 1.012*** 
 (0.706) (0.234) (0.252) 
N 202 1964 1310 
Adj. R2 0.119 0.395 0.350 
Notes: These estimates use the imputed wage for women that did not work in the previous year.  
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
  




Table 1. 9 OLS estimation of the extent of labor participation of married women, 18 to 42 years old 
  Recent Usual Days/Month   Recent Usual Hours/Week 
Variable Zero Child One Child Two Children  Zero Child One Child Two Children 
Wage (1000 yuan/day) -4.157 -15.91*** -11.11***  39.75** -6.810 -4.919 
 (5.014) (2.283) (2.660)  (17.77) (5.128) (6.473) 
Wage square 2.304 5.041*** 1.245**  -31.65* 3.143 -1.074 
 (4.355) (1.720) (0.524)  (16.15) (2.685) (1.339) 
Edu years -0.441*** -0.0292 -0.0422  -1.467** -0.626*** 0.106 
 (0.146) (0.0645) (0.0682)  (0.580) (0.236) (0.229) 
Collegesome 0.716 -1.048** -0.448  0.788 -4.013*** -5.806* 
 (1.091) (0.435) (0.796)  (3.589) (1.416) (2.990) 
age 0.538 0.359 0.246  0.724 -0.251 -1.472 
 (0.763) (0.375) (0.578)  (2.259) (1.255) (1.509) 
Age_sq -0.00755 -0.00590 -0.00529  -0.00800 -0.000607 0.0180 
 (0.0126) (0.00545) (0.00841)  (0.0367) (0.0182) (0.0223) 
health -0.285 -0.0827 -0.168  -0.0753 -1.484*** -1.009 
 (0.520) (0.155) (0.231)  (1.287) (0.534) (0.783) 
family member income 0.305 0.185 0.398*  0.143 -0.203 0.594 
 (0.293) (0.165) (0.222)  (1.169) (0.522) (0.755) 
Preschool children at home -0.555 -0.871** -0.433  -3.417 -1.500 -2.583** 
 (2.353) (0.369) (0.400)  (4.960) (1.180) (1.183) 
Location_rural -0.435 -0.367 -1.521***  0.246 -2.220** -3.566** 
 (0.741) (0.304) (0.399)  (2.538) (1.035) (1.498) 
Year2014 -0.177 0.758*** -0.685  0.217 -1.158 -4.688*** 
 (0.822) (0.291) (0.467)  (3.311) (1.011) (1.681) 
Year2016 -2.035 -0.109 -1.265**  -6.648* -4.661*** -7.457*** 
 (1.408) (0.447) (0.619)  (3.715) (1.491) (2.168) 
Year2016-Year2014 -1.86 -0.86** -0.58  -6.86 -3.50** -2.77 
  (1.54) (0.41) (0.63)  (4.40) (1.4) (2.1) 
Cons 19.37* 19.43*** 21.92**  46.64 74.06*** 80.93*** 
 (11.32) (6.437) (9.945)  (35.10) (21.65) (26.75) 
N 186 1771 1185  186 1771 1184 
Adj. R2 0.066 0.137 0.055   0.092 0.063 0.021 
Note: Sample is women who worked last year. 
Standard errors in parentheses 









Ancillary Services and Loan Repayment in Microfinance 
1 Introduction 
This essay examines a microfinance organization in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, to determine 
whether ancillary services such as training and consulting can improve repayment behavior16. Such 
services have been thought to be crucial in developed countries because more traditional methods 
from developing countries to encourage repayment (group and social pressure) are often infeasible. 
The organization studied provides such services to varying degrees to various clients, and this 
variation is the source of identification. This variation originates both from the borrower, who may 
ask for help, and the lender, who may provide it without being asked. While this raises various 
selection concerns, the primary results seem interesting. Those clients receiving greater services 
are less likely to miss payments than those receiving fewer ancillary services. Yet, under greater 
scrutiny (including within client estimates), this remains true only for those who enter the program 
with higher credit scores. The implications of this result are discussed. 
In what follows, the next section provides relevant background from the literature on 
microfinance. It is careful to distinguish between lessons from developing and developed countries. 
This sets the stage for my case study, which is described in the third section. The fourth section 
provides the data from the case study and presents the methodological approach. This approach 
will use both disaggregate monthly data and aggregated to the client data. The fifth section presents 
the results, does robustness checks and addresses issues of selection. The final section concludes 
 
16 The author is grateful to the Women’s Business Initiative Corporation (WWBIC) for providing data for the current research. 
The data is strictly anonymous. The author is not provided with any information to find out the names or other personal 
information of the WWBIC clients. 




and presents policy suggestions.  
2 Background 
The rise of microfinance organizations (MFOs) is based on the premise that lack of access to 
credit and other formal financial services are severe constraints on the growth of micro-enterprises. 
With the credit from MFOs, microentrepreneurs can start or continue their business activities, 
thereby raising household income levels, increasing employment opportunities, and promoting 
local economic development. Clients of MFOs often lack qualified collateral, which means that 
lenders are less sure that borrowers will repay their loans.17 This, combined with information 
asymmetry, locks many small borrowers out of the formal financial market.  It also leads to the 
fear that the risk of default by borrowers in microfinance will be substantially higher. In turn, this 
fear has resulted in many institutional approaches by MFOs design to increase the chance of long-
term success and repayment by their borrowers even without collateral. The success of these 
approaches helps determine the success of MFOs and, ultimately the growth in small businesses. 
Joint liability combined with dynamic incentives is the common approach to increase the 
success of microfinance. These two institutions are designed to elicit greater information from 
potential lenders and so reduced information asymmetry (Galariotis, Villa, and Yusupov 2011). 
Joint liability in the form of group lending was an essential innovation of MFOs in developing 
countries. For instance, in Bangladesh, community leaders divide potential borrowers into small 
groups. Group members are required to have regular meetings and have joint liability in 
microcredit. Thus, if one member cannot meet his or her repayment obligation, other members 
must bear the repayment of the defaulter if they want to continue borrowing from the lender. 
Through these institutionalized relationships, MFOs take advantage of local information, peer 
 
17 The lack of qualified collateral is the most crucial reason for formal commercial banks to reject loan applications. 




support, and peer pressure to gain additional information and reduce the risk and cost of default.  
Group liability is typically paired with dynamic incentives. MFOs start with very minimal 
loans and gradually increase the loan size as borrowers demonstrate reliability in repayment. Many 
of the banks, especially in developing countries, even schedule the first payment just a week after 
the initial loan disbursal and continue weekly after that; this makes the contract look much closer 
to a consumer loan than a business loan and changes the nature of the risk that the bank is taking 
on. It often results in regular communication between the MFO and borrowers that less frequent 
and more arms-length repayment would not. 
Group lending approaches in developed countries have not performed well (Chatterjee et al. 
2006). For instance, in the United States, most of the first programs copied group lending as 
conceived in Bangladesh, but have since switched to focus on individual loans (Schreiner and 
Morduch 2001; Schreiner and Woller 2003). Less than one-sixth of US microenterprise programs 
make loans to groups (Schreiner 2001). The possible reasons for the lack of success are that in 
more anonymous markets, borrowers do not know each other and have fewer shared bonds and 
care less about group reputations. This problem is made worse as the purpose of loans in the United 
States is more diversified, making it more difficult to find an appropriate peer group of borrowers 
undertaking similar enterprises.  In short, there has been less learning about particular risks and 
less peer support and pressure in US implementations of group liability. 
A primary concern in developed countries in making use of individual loans is the limited 
human capital of microfinance borrowers. Thus, besides financial constraints, potential borrowers 
are likely to lack business skills and business experience, which also makes microcredit borrowers 
a high-risk group. Because group liability has not helped transfer skills, other approaches have 
emerged. Thus, MFOs in developed countries spend considerable resources on so-called "ancillary 




services" that are designed to improve the human and social capital of borrowers. The thought is 
that providing these services can play an essential role in improving the borrowers’ capacity and 
willingness to repay loans.  
Ancillary services take various forms, including business consulting, training, teaching 
financial literacy (Sayinzoga, Bulte, and Lensink 2016; Schreiner and Morduch 2001), and even 
psychological consulting. These services help microentrepreneurs accumulate business knowledge, 
improve their business profits, and increase a sustainable cash flow increasing the ability to repay 
the loans. This may be especially important for microenterprises in developed countries, where 
market competition is more severe than less developed economies, and the gaps in education and 
social capital may be more substantial. In addition to simply building up human and social capital, 
the provision of ancillary services has been thought to increase the satisfaction of clients.  They 
recognize they are being given tools and see the MFO as part of their team. This builds a strong 
feeling of reciprocity. Borrowers are less likely to default if they such a sense of responsibility and 
good will toward the lender.  The hope is that they will also seek assistance if troubles develop. 
Despite the theory that ancillary services should increase repayment behavior, the existing 
evidence on its impact is unsettled. Some empirical research demonstrates that training and 
consulting have a positive effect on the business performance of participants who got loans from 
microfinance organizations (Abeysekera 2015; Bjorvatn and Tungodden 2009; Rama 2016),  
while some others suggest that the effect of training and consulting is less clear – in some 
circumstances positive but other cases simply no influence (Fairlie, Karlan, and Zinman 2015; 
Mckenzie and Woodruff 2012). Those who find an absence of an effect may be correct in their 
cases. However, the literature is often not successful in dealing with the extent of heterogeneity 
or/and selection problems.  




Thus, in some cases, the treated group appears to be those least likely to benefit and most 
likely to succeed (Aakvik, Heckman, and Vytlacil 2005).  This cream-skimming exists when 
those who would do well, in any event, are provided the ancillary services. For this reason, 
programs that offer mandatory training to all may provide a more accurate measure of success(Paul 
2014). This increases the cost of training borrowers (Bhatt and Tang 2001) and may even cause 
those costs to exceed the social benefits of training (Friedlander, Greenberg, and Robins 1997; 
Lalonde 1995).  
Recent studies have overcome the selection bias problem in the measurement of ancillary 
services effect by using econometrics methodologies or randomized control experiments. 
Instrumental variables and latent variable models are widely used in identifying the treatment 
effects of training. In developing countries, Karlan et al. (Karlan and Valdivia 2011)used a 
randomized control experiment to prove that business services have little or no evidence on change 
of business revenue, profits, or employment. Instead, they observed the improvement of business 
knowledge and customer retention in the treatment group. Berger et al. (2014) argue that business 
training combined with financial services improves business outcomes for male 
microentrepreneurs in Tanzania, but not significantly so for female microentrepreneurs. Fewer 
random controlled studies exist in developed countries. In one notable study, Fairlie et al. (2015) 
find no long-lasting effects of business training in the United States for individuals who are 
potentially subject either to credit or human capital constraints or to discrimination in the labor 
market. 
Similarly, Créponetal did not identify significant positive impacts in terms of business 
outcomes for participants (Kluve et al. 2017). One explanation of training from microfinance 
organizations (MFOs) has a small influence on increasing income of the low-income family is that 




they already have survival skills and do not need to be trained. However, Heckman, Lalonde, and 
Smith (1999) propose that training from government or other organizations generates small 
benefits because per-capita expenditures of training are comparatively small, and in general, these 
programs target relatively unskilled and less able individuals. Another reason why the ancillary 
service effect in experiments is not significant may be that the borrowers’ interactions are not 
considered in the experimental design. Beyond business outcomes, few studies have focused on 
the relationship between ancillary services and loan repayment performance. Karlan and Valdivia 
(2011) find that training improves perfect repayment18 . However, Giné and Mansuri find that 
training has no significant impact on repayment rates for microfinance clients in rural Pakistan 
(McKenzie and Woodruff 2014).  
In empirical studies, researchers use different ways to measure repayment performance. Some 
of them use the share of the money borrowed that is eventually actually repaid. Others use the 
number of times a payment is missed. Repayment on time suggests good business performance 
and cash flow. Frequent failure to meet payments means the borrower faces difficulties in running 
their business. One regularity from past studies is that a substantial share of borrowers eventually 
repay loans, although this is often happening after the actual end of the loan. Thus, delays in 
payments occur much more frequently than “loan loss.”  Following this previous literature, we 
use the missed payments to quantify the microentrepreneurs’ repayment performance.  
It is also the case that most previous studies examining ancillary services evaluate the 
influence of a scheduled large class or classes in improving loan performance. Sustaining one-to-
one consulting services have not previously been examined. However, the hope is that such on-
going and personal attention will lead to a deeper and closer relationship between the financial 
 
18 A client is said to have had a perfect repayment record if her payments over the cycle plus her savings were always enough to 
cover the amount borrowed plus interest. 




organization and its clients (Haim et al. 2007). Again, this assistance by the MFO may help 
improve borrowers’ repayment through two channels. First, training and consulting may deliver 
the business knowledge and skills the clients need. Flexibly and easily scheduled one-on-one 
consulting can help those who need assistance get it on time. Second, repeated consulting increases 
the borrower's satisfaction and generates reciprocity. This makes borrowers more willing to pay 
back on time (Ibtissem and Bouri, 2013; Tchakoute-Tchuigoua and Soumaré, 2019). In this paper, 
we will test the influence of consulting services on repayment behavior.  
 
3 Institutional setting and intervention 
The Wisconsin Women’s Business Initiative Corporation (WWBIC) is a non-profit economic 
development corporation designed to assist those who are interested in starting or expanding their 
businesses but face barriers in accessing traditional financing or resources. 19  In addition to 
providing loans, the corporation has offered ancillary business development assistance services 
since 2000. These include training and consulting. The content of this training and consulting 
provides entrepreneurship development, business planning, teaching how to access capital, 
marketing strategies, accounting support, legal information, personal budgeting, eCommerce, and 
technology support. Clients can talk with the consultants through a phone call, online chat, email, 
or in a face-to-face meeting20. The group training classes are mainly on weekends. 21 Clients can 
register for a specific class or directly walk-in. Each year, on average, clients participate in over 
20,000 collective consulting hours and 500 scheduled group training sessions, typically averaging 
about an hour.  The training attendance rate is relatively low, with fewer total person-hours of 
 
19 In particular, women, people of color, veterans and low-income individuals are the organization's target population. 
20 Clients can make an appointment with the consultant and meet in the consultant office. 
21 The are also mainly held in the WWBIC office buildings in Milwaukee, Madison, Kenosha, and Racine.  




training provided than consulting.  Clients prefer to get the business services through consulting, 
and it is this consulting that begins early and continues well into the relationship with the client 
while the training is typically at the beginning of the relationship.  WWBIC staff makes clear that 
they spend a far larger percentage of funds to support consulting services than training. 
In the WWBIC business assistance project (providing ancillary services), the client’s 
attendance in a training class is voluntary. Nevertheless, the situations in which clients use 
consulting services are more diverse. Clients can initiate communication with consultants by phone, 
online chat, or face-to-face meetings. Also, consultants actively initiate calls to clients.  Some of 
these are "check-ups," but they also may reflect a circumstance in which the consultant thinks a 
client may need supervision or help for their business. Consequently, there may be self-selection 
(indeed, two-way selection) in measuring the treatment effect of business assistance. However, in 
the consulting service records data, we cannot tell who takes the initiative to call the other party. 
The training and consulting are not mandatory so that clients initiate participation according 
to their own perceived needs.22 Nevertheless, consultants actively keep in touch with the clients 
by calling, especially those whom they think may need supervision or help with their business. 
Therefore, the use of consulting services sometimes cannot be avoided by the borrowers. Again, 
the consulting service might be more likely to be provided if a consultant believes that a client 
faces a high chance of mismanaging or default. In other words, a consultant is likely to initiate 
contact with a riskier client. While we will discuss the selection issue in more detail in the later 
sections, this behavior is the opposite of that implied by cream-skimming.  Those anticipated to 
do well and repay the loan will be less treated. 
 
 
22 Anyone who registered as WWBIC member count as a client, not only the clients who applied or received loans.  




4 Data and Estimation Methods 
In this section, I first summarize the data and identify the critical dependent and independent 
variables. I then describe the estimation methods used in the paper.  
 
4.1 Data description 
Data are provided by WWBIC and they include the size of the loan and the critical repayment 
data. Also included are the socioeconomic characteristics of the clients, the type of business run 
by the client, and the consulting and training attendance records of the clients.  This information 
is available between the years 2000 to 2015. The critical unit of measure in the aggregated data is 
each specific loan.  A single client can have more than one loan, and this generates more than one 
observation for the same client however, the vast majority of clients have only a single loan. I 
eliminate loans with missing data when using the aggregate data at the loan level.  The most 
common source of missing data is the absence of socioeconomic characteristics of the clients. The 
data set of completed observations is a sample of 730 loans over 472 clients, and the total payment 
times are 15810. The average repayment period is 21.7 months. 
The data provides transaction information on each loan, which indicates whether or not a given 
client made their payment. Thus, I know the length of the loan to any point in time and the number 
of payments over that length that have been missed. The data consists of both completed loans and 
those not yet run to the termination. As we will see, this difference does not prove crucial to the 
results as the full data set and the data set of completed loans return very similar results. The data 
on all loans are used to create three measures of repayment difficulty.  The first is whether or not 
the client made a scheduled payment in a given month (MissedMonthlyPayment). This allows us 
to generate a panel of months by a loan that we use in what we refer to as the disaggregated 




approach. The second dependent variable is at the loan level and is the ratio of the total number of 
payments missed, divided by the total number of anticipated payments (MissedPaymentRate). The 
third measures a period of intense difficulty and simply indicates whether or not the loan had three 
or more missed payments in a row (MissedThreePayments). This measure is again at the loan level 
and part of what we refer to as the aggregate aggregated approach. If a borrower does not repay 
for three consecutive months, it usually implies that the client's operation encountered severe 
problems.  
Clients who register with WWBIC can receive ancillary services many times and on multiple 
occasions. In our paper, when we define the training participants in the monthly payment data if a 
client ever sat in the training classes. Also, if they ever talked with the consultants before payment 
day, they are identified as a consulting participant. However, in the aggregated payment 
performance data, participants are those who ever used the ancillary service before the last 
payment date. Total hours of training and consulting are available for each type of participant. 
 
<Insert Table 2.1 about here> 
 
Table 2.1 shows that 81.6% of the monthly payments have either consulting or training 
services before them. Of those, 7.9% is only after training services, a remarkable 49% use is only 
consulting services, and 24.7% use both. Finally, 18.4% of the sample participates in neither 
ancillary service.  
 
<Insert Table 2.2 about here> 
 




Table 2.2 is the descriptive analysis of the aggregated payment data; each observation is a loan. 
It shows that 85.8% of the sample use either consulting or training services.  Of those, 6.2% use 
only training services, a remarkable 51.1% use is only consulting services, and 28.5% use both. 
Finally, 14.2% of the sample participates in neither ancillary service. Among those who used 
ancillary service, the average training hours are 3.48, and the average consulting hours are a 
remarkably high 30.95. Thus, more recipients used consulting than training, and those using 
consulting used it for more hours than those using training.  It is the hours of training and 
consulting that provide the variation within the loan recipients to measure the influence of ancillary 
services. 
Both Table 2.1 and Table 2.2 show that the payment performance is better for those that 
participated in neither ancillary service than those who never participated in ancillary services. 
Also, the repayment statistics look better for those receiving consulting than for those receiving 
only training. This fits the intuition of those providing the services at WWBIC. 
In terms of other characteristics, borrowers who only use consulting services have higher 
household incomes than other categories. Consulting service participants have more years of 
education. In general, the consulting category has higher average credit scores and lower business 
course participation ratios than the training participants23. Training participants are younger on 
average than only-consulting participants and borrowers who never participate in any service. 
Membership years is the time between when the client registered in WWBIC and their loan 
payment ended. In Table 2.1 and Table 2.2, clients who never used ancillary service have the 
shortest membership years. We measure the distance to WWBIC by the driving hours from the 
clients’ home address to the closest WWBIC campus. According to Table 2.1 and Table 2.2, the 
 
23 The business courses not offered by WWBIC. 




users of the consulting service live farther than the clients use the training service, and the groups 
that use only consulting services always have the longest distance than other groups of the clients. 
 
<Insert Table 2.3 about here> 
 
Table 2.3 shows divide the descriptive statistics of the high credit score group from that of the 
low credit score group. This division happens at a credit score of 620. As would be anticipated, the 
on-time payment performance of the high credit score group exceeds that of the low credit score 
group. The former is above is 90%, while the latter is 80%. Among those with higher scores, 20% 
of clients experienced three consecutive missed-payments, and this is 41% for the low credit score 
group. The high credit score group also has a higher average household income, a lower ending-
balance-loan ratio, and more years of education. The high credit score group spends less time 
participating but actually spends longer participating in the consulting.  
 
4.2 Empirical Strategy 
The first set of models use each repayment period as an observation. The second set of models 
follow the description above and use the individual loan as an observation. I identify the first as a 
disaggregated or panel strategy and the latter as an aggregated observation strategy. 
 
4.2.a The Disaggregated Observations Strategy 
Payment data is available for every loan for every month. Thus, we initially take the 
underlying dependent variable to simply be whether or not a client made the payment in each 
month. This provides panel data across individuals and across time. 




The initial model of estimation follows a reduced linear model: 
𝑌 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑟 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑛 + 𝛿𝑋 +                  (1) 
where Y is whether or not the client missed a payment in the observed month 
(MissedMonthlyPayment). The value of Y is one when the payment was missed. X are the control 
variables, including client and loan characteristics. 𝑇𝑟 and 𝐶𝑛 are the total hours of training and 
of consulting, respectively, that the client attended before the monthly payment was due.  
The structure of the data also allows an estimation based on client variation. As the client 
received more training and consulting, does their individual before the change. This fixed effect 
estimate controls for sorting. Unchanging characteristics of the client that might influence 
repayment are held constant. 
 
4.2.b The Aggregated Data Strategy 
Alternative use of the data treats each loan as one observation to measure the impact of 
ancillary service on overall repayment performance. The initial linear model of estimation has the 
same structure as model (1). However, dependent variable Y now is loan repayment behavior 
measured by the fraction of missed payment periods out of total payment periods 
(MissedPaymentRate). Another repayment behavior variable is a dummy variable, 
MissedThreePayments, which shows whether the client missed three times repayment 
continuously or not. X are the characteristic variables of the client and macroeconomic variables, 
including credit score, household income, loan interest rate, ending balance ratio, education years, 
gender, number of children in the family, and GDP growth rate. 𝐶𝑛 and 𝑇𝑟 are the total hours of 
consulting and training that the client attended before the end of the loan payment, respectively. 
The simple model with aggregate ancillary variables shows a correlation of each of ancillary 




service variables (consulting and training) with the missed payment behavior.  
Note, however, that this may cause estimation difficulties. At some point during the loan, the 
borrower may have difficulties and might miss payments.  Such a problem may elicit a response 
by WWBIC. In this case, the causation is reversed, loan problems generate ancillary services.  If 
the services help create future repayments, a beneficial influence may yet emerge. Yet if not, the 
observed correlation could show that additional services are associated with poor repayment.  
Thus, the initial approach must be examined with this concern in mind. It will be a problem that 
we will address. For now, we examine the relationship between the sum of all ancillary services 
used over the course of the loan as the critical explanatory variable in determining repayment 
behavior.  
There is also concern that the hours of consulting are endogenous. There may exist 
unobservable characteristics that influence both the use of ancillary services and repayment 
performance. Those who correctly anticipate having a successful enterprise may both be less likely 
to participate in ancillary services and have a strong repayment history.  Such endogeneity would 
generate a spurious negative correlation between services and repayment.  Alternatively, those 
who have higher ability may have more success in their enterprise and be more likely to believe 
ancillary services are valuable.  This sorting would be a variation on classic ability bias and could 
generate a spurious positive association between services and repayment. We are uncertain as to 
the extent of each of these offsetting possibilities.  
In order to account for such endogeneity, an instrumental variable estimator will be used. The 
first instrumental variable is the length of membership of WWBIC. We expect the membership 
years to influence a person’s probability of participating in ancillary services, but not to 
independently affect the payment performance given the other explanatory variables. Anyone 




interested in WWBIC's services can register as a client and they need not be a borrower. Thus, 
membership is often longer than the time they have had a loan. The second instrumental variable 
is the distance between the client’s home and the closest WWBIC campus24. This distance indicates 
the ease with which customers use face-to-face training and consulting services. Closer customers 
can participate in training and consulting at a lower cost and so are more likely to use the ancillary 
services. While phone consulting can be done with an equal cost from anywhere, in-person 
consulting allows greater opportunities for interaction with multiple consultants and other 
borrowers. It also allows role-playing and access to on-site computer resources. Critically, we think 
the distance between the client’s home and WWBIC is exogenous to their repayment behavior. 
Thus, the instruments appear at least sensible.  
 
5 Results and Robustness Checks 
The results are initially presented for the disaggregated data and then for the aggregated data. 
 
5.1 Ancillary services and payment performance: Disaggregated data 
The first column of Table 4 shows a simplified version of (1) that ignores other control 
variables. The results show that training services have a positive relationship with missed-
payments while consulting services negatively associate with missed-payments. In the second 
column, we add the year dummy variables to the first column model. As a result, the coefficients 
of training and consulting have not changed, but the absolute value of the coefficient of the 
consulting variable has decreased significantly. This may indicate that consulting services is 
related to the economic and social background over the years. The third column is to add loan-
 
24 WWBIC has four office locations. They are located in Milwaukee, Kenosha, Racine and Madison. 




specific variables to the first column model, and the coefficients of training and consulting have 
not changed much. The fourth column is to add the year dummy variable to the third column, and 
the coefficient signs for training and consulting remain consistent. The fifth column includes loan-
specific and client-specific variables. It can be seen that the impact of training on the monthly 
payment is no longer significant. In the last column, when we add the year dummy variable to the 
fifth model, neither the effects of training or consulting is significant. 
 
<Insert Table 2.4 about here> 
 
From those regression results, except for the last two models, regardless of whether there are 
control variables and year fixed effects, consulting hours have always been negatively related to 
missed-payment behavior, which aligns with our expectations. However, the positive correlation 
between training and monthly missed-payment was a result that did not meet expectations. 
Possible reasons are heterogeneity and self-selection among borrowers. People with lower 
repayment ability and people at higher risk are more likely to miss the payment, and they are also 
more likely to face difficulties and use training and consulting services. In the last regression in 
Table 2.4, we added the client variable, but the results were not significant. Based on this model, 
we use client fixed-effect models to capture the unobserved personal riskiness in this panel data. 
The results are in Table 2.5. 
 
<Insert Table 2.5 about here> 
 
Table 2.5 includes client-fixed-effect regressions. The first column is the regression result 




using the whole sample, and the next two columns are the high credit score sample and the low 
credit score sample. The watershed for distinguishing high and low credit scores is 620 points, 
which is about the average credit score of the whole sample. It shows that when we use the client 
fixed effect, in the overall sample and the low credit score group, the effects of training and 
consulting become not significant. However, for the high credit score sample, after using the client 
fixed effect, the relationship between service participation and monthly missed payment behavior 
is significantly negatively correlated.  
In the sample with high credit scores (>620), the coefficient on training is -0.01, and the 
coefficient on consulting is -0.0008. Making some simple assumptions gives a sense of the 
magnitude of these coefficients. For example, assume a client whose credit score is more than 620 
moved up in the distribution from having no training or consulting (about 18 percent of the sample) 
to the mean level of 2.44 and 28.1, respectively.25 The change in training would decrease the 
average probability of missed payment by 0.024, which is large given the high credit score group 
mean missed payment rate of 0.08. The change in consulting would decrease the average 
probability of missed payment by 0.023 which also remains substantial. 
The critical credit score was examined to see if the pattern was robust. While magnitudes 
change modestly in credit scores from 620 to 680, the basic pattern of the regression results 
remains the same. Table 2.5 shows the results of choosing different critical scores 620, 640, and 
680.  In each case, the high credit score subsample benefits from training and consulting, as 
reflected by a lower probability of missing a payment. This is not true for any of the low credit 
score groups. 
To sum up these regression results, we conclude that when using the client fixed-effect on the 
 
25 Such a comparison provides a more conservative estimate as the standard deviations often used for such exercises are 
substantially larger than the means. 




panel data to correct the heterogeneity bias of individual clients, both training and consulting 
services have significant positive effects on the monthly repayment performance of high credit 
score group. However, in the low credit score group, the impact of training is not significant, and 
consulting is weakly but negatively related to the timely repayment behavior. Generally speaking, 
the credit score is highly correlated with better education, higher intelligence, and more patient 
time preferences (Li et al. 2015). Thus, it seems likely that the high credit score clients probably 
have higher ability and better learning capabilities. They may be more efficient learners and 
producers of ancillary services. They learn and implement advice more successfully and so within 
this sample missed payment decrease with greater services. 
The correlation for consulting among those with poor credit ratings may reflect reverse 
causation. The third column in Table 2.5 shows that an hour consulting increases the probability 
of missing payment by 0.0016. As suggested, consultants reach out to those in trouble. As a 
consequence, those likely to miss payments may be sought out by the consultants, but it is clear 
that this is insufficient to change the pattern of results.  
To explore the dynamics of the process between ancillary services and missed-payments, we 
alter the way we measure those services. One concern is that causation may be reversed. After a 
missed payment or two, the borrower may seek help, or the lender may attempt to provide help.  
This help that follows an episode of missed payments may then reduce the probability of a second 
missed payment episode. This would be hard to isolate in the current specification or the aggregate 
data. To examine this, the variables of interest are changed to measure the ancillary services 
participation hours that occurred one month and three months after the scheduled monthly payment 
date, based on whether the payment is on-time, missed, or missed for two consecutive months. 
According to the results shown in Table 2.6, there does not appear to be more ancillary services 




hours following a missed-payment or after two consecutive missed-payments when compared to 
on-time payment. If anything, it appears to be the opposite. On average, in the month after payment 
on time, the consulting time is 0.39 hours, and the training time is 0.03 hours, while in the month 
after a missed-payment, the consulting time is 0.21 hours and the training time is 0.01 hours. So 
judging from the number of hours of ancillary service participation, the average participation time 
after missed-payments is less than the time after regular repayment. 
 
<Insert Table 2.6 about here> 
 
Yet, the fact that training and consulting do not seem to spike after missed payment episodes 
does not mean that the training following such an episode may not be critical. To investigate this 
further, we changed the critical intervention variations to measures the cumulative training and 
consulting participation hours since the last missed-payment. If there has been no missed payment, 
it remains the sum of hours since the loan started. These new independent variables are used to 
repeat the models in the last column of Table 2.4 and the first three columns in Table 2.5. The 
regression results are shown in Table 2.7.  
As before, the initial results suggest that consulting and training services significantly improve 
payment performance. In the OLS regression in the first column of Table 2.7, that is, when we 
control the client-specific characteristics and the year fixed-effect, the probability of a monthly 
missed-payment is significantly reduced by 0.32% for one additional hour of either consulting or 
training after the last missed-payment.  
In the client fixed-effect models, the repayment behavior of customers with low credit scores 
is now also significantly improved by services. On average, an additional hour of consulting 




service can significantly reduce the probability of monthly missed payment for high credit score 
groups by 0.35% while significantly reducing this probability for low credit score groups by 0.28%. 
Thus, while both of the sums of services as well as services since a missed payment matter for 
high credit borrowers, it appears to be the services provided after a missed payment helps the low 
credit score group. The implication is that the accumulated services may not play a role for the low 
credit score group unless they are after a missed payment. This would be consistent with the 
services provided after a missed payment being of the sort that successfully solves problems. 
 
<Insert Table 2.7 about here> 
 
The fact that services after a missed payment are more effective for low credit score groups 
suggests that the continuous availability of services is particularly useful for this group. Thus, 
frontloading all the training and consulting might pay dividends for the high credit score group but 
is unlikely to benefit the low credit score group. 
 
5.2 Ancillary services and Payment Performance: Aggregated data 
In the aggregated data analysis, we first use OLS and Probit estimators to measure the impact 
of ancillary services on MissedPaymentRate and MissThreePayment, respectively. The regression 
results will be shown in Tables 2.8 and 2.9. We then use a 2SLS estimator and instrumental 
variables as a robustness test. The test reflects an effort to control for the self-selection by clients 
of the amount of ancillary services chosen. These results will be shown in Tables 2.10 and 2.11. 
Table 8 shows the regression results of the OLS estimator for the full sample, the high credit 
score group, and the low credit score group, respectively. We can see that the coefficients on 




training are not significant, while the coefficients of consulting are each significantly negative. 
Focusing on the full sample, an increase in consulting by one hour decreases the 
MissedPaymentRate decreases by 0.103%. For the high and low credit score sample, an additional 
hour of consulting reduces the MissedPaymentRate rate by 0.09% and 0.12%, respectively. 
However, these two coefficients are not significantly different.  
 
<Insert Table 2.8 about here> 
 
Table 2.9 shows the marginal effects of ancillary services when we use MissedThreePayments 
to measure payment performance. Consulting is significantly associated with a reduced incidence 
of three consecutive missed payments for the overall sample and both of the credit score groups. 
By increasing one hour of consulting, the rate of three consecutive missed payments decreases by 
0.3%. At the same time, the coefficients on training are not significant.  
 
<Insert Table 2.9 about here> 
 
Table 2.10 includes the 2SLS regression results run on the whole sample and the different 
credit score groups. It can be seen in the first-stage regressions of the whole sample that when the 
driving distance between the client's home and WWBIC increased by 1%, the probability of 
participating in the training decreased by 0.9% on average. When the membership increases by 
one year, total training hours increased by 0.64, and consulting hours increased by 5.3. Distance 
does not have a significant effect on consulting hours. This may reflect that the majority consulted 
by phone, which is less related to distance. The first-stage regression results for the high and low 




credit score groups largely mimic these results.26 
 
<Insert Table 2.10 about here> 
 
In the second stage regression of overall and high credit score group, the coefficients on the 
consulting variable are significantly negative. The absolute values of the coefficients are larger 
than the OLS regression which may reflect measurement error. In these estimates, when consulting 
services increases by one hour, the whole sample MissedPaymentRate decreases by 0.203%, and 
the high credit score sample MissedPaymentRate decreases by 0.198%. However, the low credit 
score sample’s consulting coefficient remains insignificant. These results indicate that after a 
plausible attempt to control for endogeneity, consulting services retain the role of improving the 
overall and high credit score borrowers’ repayment behavior.27 This largely chimes in with the 
disaggregate results that at least confirmed a role among those with higher credit scores. 
As mentioned, the size of the coefficient on consulting services increases after the use of 
instrumental variables. This argues that the unobserved bias in the data has a positive correlation 
with the MissedPaymentRate. Thus, those using consulting services are those who are more at risk 
of missing payments. This fits intuition in which those at risk either search out services or in which 
the consultants reach out to those at risk.  
Yet, this pattern is absent for borrowers with low credit scores. Compared with borrowers with 
low credit scores, those with high credit scores likely may pay more attention to their reputation 
 
26 Tests for weak instruments show that in the regressions of the overall and high credit score samples, the minimum eigenvalue 
statistic are 8.6 and 7.6, respectively. Both of them are higher than critical value 7.03. Therefore, there is no weak IV problem. 
But the regressions of the low credit score groups cannot pass the weak IV test. This is because, from the F values of the first 
stage regressions, the instrumental variables can not explain the training hours well.  
27 Endogeneity tests show training and consulting variables in overall and high credit score group are endogenous, but the low 
credit score group variables are exogenous. 




and long-term business development, so they are also more likely to seek help in a crisis. Also, 
perhaps because of their higher than average education level and perhaps ability, consulting 
services has produced better results for high credit score borrowers.  In this sense, high credit 
score borrowers may be more efficient producers. They more successfully turn business advice 
into business success. 
To give a further sense of the magnitude of the coefficient on consulting, we assume a client 
whose credit score is more than 620 moved up in the distribution from having no consulting (about 
20 percent of the aggregated sample) to the mean level of 32.25 hours. This change would decrease 
the average probability of a missed payment by 0.067, which is substantial, given the high credit 
score group mean missed payment rate of 0.090. 
Table 2.11 shows the IV Probit regression results of MissedThreePayments. The instrument 
variables are as before. The first stage regressions show that membership years have a significantly 
positive relationship with training and consulting participation. The distance has a significant 
negative correlation with the hours of training, that is, the farther the client's home is from WWBIC, 
the shorter training time. However, consistent with the previous estimates, distance cannot explain 
consulting participation.28 The second stage coefficient on consulting for the high credit score 
group continues to be significantly negative and neither service takes a significant result for the 
low credit score group. 29 
 
<Insert Table 2.11 about here> 
 
 
28 Weak instrument tests show that the weak IV problem exist in these regressions. 
29 Endogeneity tests show that in the overall and low credit score group regressions, training and consulting are endogenous 
variables, but in the high credit score group, they are exogenous. 




In the high credit score group, without instrumental variables, the overall marginal effect of 
consulting on the MissedThreePayments is -0.003 (Table 2.9). With the instrumental variables, the 
marginal effect is -0.0032 (calculated from Table 2.11). These results indicate that after attempting 
to control for endogeneity, among those with high credit scores, consulting services still have a 
significant effect on reducing continuous payment shortfalls. The correction substantially changes 
the marginal effect as well, with the instrumental variables, the marginal effect is -0.0034 for the 
overall sample, -0.0032 for the high credit score group and -0.0037 for the low credit score group. 
These marginal effects are only modestly larger than those from the original probit without 
instrumenting. To again give a simple illustration, if a client's hours of consulting services increase 
by 32.25 (as used before), the probability of three consecutive missed-payment will decrease by 
0.11. Compared with the ratio of three consecutive missed payments in the high credit score group 
is 0.18, this value is considerable. 
 
5.3 Additional Robustness Results 
An initial concern is that we take a window of loans that include some which have not been 
completed. If the uncompleted loans are not representative of the completed loans, they may 
influence the results we have presented. For example, it may be that uncompleted loans will fail, 
be written off and simply not be completed. Such loans may provide information about success 
but may not be indicative of completed loans. Put somewhat differently, the completed loans may, 
despite missed payments, be a selected set of overwise more successful loans, and their repayment 
history may be better and more to the point, the relationship between ancillary services and their 
repayment may differ. 
The uncompleted loans represent approximately 1/6 of all loans. These were loans still in 




process at the time we were given that data. To examine if their presence biases the overall 
estimates, we exclude them from our sample. We repeat each of the fundamental estimates in the 
tables for both the disaggregate and aggregate approaches.  These are presented in the Appendix 
as Appendix Tables 2.2 - 2.10. The removal of the uncompleted loans does not fundamentally 
change the pattern of results. In the disaggregated approach consulting continues to be routinely 
associated with a reduced likelihood of missed payments in the estimate until the client fixed effect 
results. It also continues to be associated with a reduced probability of missed payment in the fixed 
effect results for those with higher credit scores. Similarly, in the aggregate approach, the role of 
ancillary services is of the same direction, magnitude, and generally of significance.  We 
conclude that the uncompleted loans do not dramatically bias the tenor of our results.  
 
6 Conclusion and policy implications 
In this paper, we estimated the influence of repeated and continuing lender-borrower 
interactions on borrowers’ repayment performance. Using the data from WWBIC, we set up the 
individual fixed-effect models and instrumental variable models and find that sustaining business 
assistance is helpful to improve the microentrepreneur’s repayment behavior, especially for the 
high credit score borrowers. Total consulting services hours are endogenous, and the riskier 
borrowers are more likely to get the consulting service. In this regard, the service provided by the 
lenders may resolve the potential information asymmetry in the sense that the customer realizes 
that he/she is facing difficulties and actively seeks help from the consultant.  
We provide some interesting empirical patterns to describe the effect of lender-borrower 
interactions on the quality of repayment: (1) training and consulting services can significantly 
improve the monthly repayment behavior among the high credit score borrowers; (2) training and 




consulting services are more effective on high credit score borrowers than low credit score 
borrowers; (3) riskier borrowers respond more to the consulting service while consulting services 
can significantly improve the quality of the borrower’s repayment regardless of the borrower’s 
riskiness. 
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Chapter 2 Figures and Tables 
Table 2. 1 Statistical summary of characteristics for service participants and non-participants (disaggregated performance) 







 mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd 
MissedMonthlyPayment a 0.16 0.36 0.15 0.36 0.14 0.35 0.15 0.36 0.14 0.35 0.2 0.4 
Training hours c 2.87 8.3 8.22 14.02 0 0 8.99 12.14 3.51 9.07 0 0 
Consulting hours d 21.89 25.98 0 0 25.7 21.31 37.63 32.33 26.84 26.36 0 0 
Default ratio e 0.21 0.32 0.08 0.23 0.22 0.31 0.27 0.34 0.22 0.32 0.16 0.35 
Loan interest rate 0.07 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.1 0.03 
Household income f 2.14 1.75 1.45 1.04 2.41 2.01 1.76 1.23 2.12 1.76 2.24 1.68 
Education year 14.82 2.49 14.38 2.05 14.96 2.44 14.65 2.8 14.81 2.53 14.88 2.3 
College degree 0.76 0.43 0.7 0.46 0.81 0.39 0.7 0.46 0.77 0.42 0.75 0.43 
Gender 0.35 0.48 0.17 0.37 0.42 0.49 0.31 0.46 0.36 0.48 0.29 0.45 
Married 0.58 0.49 0.46 0.5 0.63 0.48 0.59 0.49 0.6 0.49 0.52 0.5 
Credit score g 633.84 85.27 605.93 74.63 650.31 84.03 629 85.72 639.58 84.94 608.42 82.03 
Business courses 0.8 0.4 0.93 0.26 0.81 0.39 0.82 0.38 0.83 0.38 0.68 0.47 
Business experience 3.19 5.07 2.07 2.58 3.57 5.31 3.18 4.13 3.31 4.79 2.67 6.12 
Age h 42.14 10.18 38.24 9.92 41.89 10.33 42.26 9.29 41.65 10.05 44.28 10.46 
Distance i 0.69 2.3 0.34 0.28 0.86 2.66 0.35 0.35 0.65 2.09 0.86 3.06 
Membership years j 3.09 2.42 3.05 1.87 2.68 1.91 4.5 3.14 3.26 2.49 2.31 1.93 
N 15518  1220  7606  3834  12660  2858  
 
a MissedMonthlyPayment is a dummy variable to show whether missed the payment in one month. 
c Training hours are the total training hours the clients participated before their loan payment ended. 
d Consulting hours are the total consulting hours the clients participated in before their loan payment ended. 
e Default ratio is the ratio of loan ending balance and the loan amount. 
f Household income is the monthly household income per capita. 
g Credit score was the borrowers’ credit score when they applied for the loan. 
h Age is when borrowers pay or should pay the loan every month. 
i Distance is the driving hours between the client’s home and the nearest WWBIC office. 
j Membership years is the time between when the client registered in WWBIC and their loan payment ended. 
 
  






Table 2. 2 Statistical summary of characteristics for service participants and non-participants (aggregated performance) 







 mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd 
MissedPaymentRate (%) k 0.14 0.21 0.17 0.24 0.12 0.2 0.14 0.2 0.13 0.2 0.22 0.24 
MissedThreePayments l 0.28 0.45 0.31 0.47 0.26 0.44 0.29 0.46 0.28 0.45 0.34 0.47 
Training hours c 2.98 8.39 6.68 12.86 0.00 0.00 9.02 12.36 3.48 8.97 0.00 0.00 
Consulting hours d 26.54 29.13 0.00 0.00 29.54 23.65 40.17 35.68 30.95 29.20 0.00 0.00 
Default ratio e 0.25 0.36 0.14 0.33 0.25 0.35 0.29 0.37 0.26 0.36 0.18 0.36 
Loan interest rate 0.08 0.03 0.10 0.02 0.07 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.10 0.02 
Household income f 2.22 1.85 1.84 1.22 2.49 2.13 1.82 1.42 2.22 1.89 2.24 1.61 
Education year 14.91 2.59 14.71 1.80 15.06 2.60 14.76 2.90 14.93 2.66 14.79 2.13 
College degree 0.78 0.42 0.78 0.42 0.80 0.40 0.74 0.44 0.78 0.42 0.78 0.42 
Gender 0.34 0.48 0.11 0.32 0.43 0.50 0.29 0.46 0.36 0.48 0.25 0.44 
Married 0.60 0.49 0.47 0.50 0.63 0.48 0.61 0.49 0.61 0.49 0.49 0.50 
Credit score g 638.19 84.98 619.64 77.34 653.61 81.65 627.80 90.45 642.60 85.33 611.64 78.08 
Business courses 0.80 0.40 0.93 0.25 0.79 0.41 0.82 0.38 0.81 0.39 0.77 0.42 
Business experience 3.15 5.00 1.60 2.22 3.76 5.43 2.81 4.07 3.29 4.88 2.32 5.66 
Age m 40.13 10.72 36.62 11.56 40.37 10.38 39.42 10.43 39.79 10.51 42.23 11.74 
Distance i 0.63 2.06 0.28 0.13 0.85 2.83 0.35 0.32 0.64 2.21 0.58 0.69 
Membership years j 3.34 2.21 3.14 1.62 2.99 1.33 4.70 3.09 3.57 2.25 1.98 1.35 
N 730  45  373  208  626  104  
k MissedPaymentRate is the ratio of missed-payment times and total scheduled payment times multiply by 100. 
l MissedThreePayments is a dummy variable for having three times or more consecutive missed payments. 
m Age is when the borrower started to pay back the loan. 
 




Table 2. 3 Means and standard deviations of characteristics for High (>620) and Low (≤620) credit score 
 Monthly     Aggregated   
 High credit score Low credit score  High credit score Low credit score 
 mean sd mean sd  mean sd mean sd 
MissedMonthlyPayment 0.09 0.29 0.23 0.42      
MissedPaymentRate (%)       0.10 0.18 0.20 0.23 
MissedThreePayments       0.20 0.40 0.41 0.49 
Training hours  2.34 6.97 3.53 9.66  2.51 7.35 3.63 9.60 
Consulting hours  25.76 27.09 17.10 23.68  29.93 30.22 21.95 26.95 
Default ratio  0.19 0.30 0.24 0.35  0.22 0.34 0.28 0.38 
Loan interest rate 0.07 0.03 0.07 0.04  0.08 0.02 0.07 0.03 
Household income  2.45 2.00 1.76 1.28  2.60 2.12 1.71 1.24 
Education year 15.29 2.46 14.25 2.40  15.49 2.56 14.14 2.42 
College degree 0.81 0.39 0.71 0.45  0.82 0.38 0.72 0.45 
Gender 0.33 0.47 0.37 0.48  0.36 0.48 0.33 0.47 
Married 0.60 0.49 0.57 0.49  0.61 0.49 0.57 0.50 
Credit score 698.04 47.47 554.30 45.33  699.68 47.61 554.87 43.14 
Business courses 0.77 0.42 0.83 0.37  0.78 0.41 0.83 0.37 
Business experience 3.12 5.09 3.28 5.05  3.09 5.18 3.23 4.76 
Age  41.81 10.15 42.54 10.20  40.49 11.03 39.66 10.29 
Distance  0.88 3.05 0.46 0.50  0.75 2.66 0.47 0.61 
Membership years  2.84 2.29 3.40 2.54  3.26 2.04 3.45 2.42 








Table 2. 4 The impact of ancillary service on the monthly payment 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Training hours  0.00132*** 0.00107*** 0.00121*** 0.000743** 0.000476 0.000204 
 (0.000378) (0.000368) (0.000385) (0.000372) (0.000367) (0.000358) 
Consulting hours  -0.00130*** -0.000342** -0.00159*** -0.000266** -0.000771*** 0.000161 
 (0.000115) (0.000134) (0.000120) (0.000132) (0.000117) (0.000128) 
Default ratio   0.0914*** 0.139*** 0.0512*** 0.0936*** 
   (0.0105) (0.0110) (0.0106) (0.0112) 
Loan interest rate  -0.484*** -0.981*** -0.307*** -0.643*** 
   (0.106) (0.117) (0.106) (0.117) 
Age   0.00391* -0.000982 0.00371* 0.000800 
   (0.00214) (0.00211) (0.00217) (0.00214) 
Age_square   -0.0000168 0.0000354 -0.0000247 0.00000544 
   (0.0000240) (0.0000237) (0.0000245) (0.0000241) 
Credit score      -0.000763*** -0.000670*** 
     (0.0000345) (0.0000353) 
Edu years     -0.0158*** -0.0159*** 
     (0.00157) (0.00155) 
Edu college more    0.0966*** 0.0931*** 
     (0.00933) (0.00924) 
Gender     0.0204*** 0.0351*** 
     (0.00626) (0.00621) 
Married     -0.0217*** -0.0297*** 
     (0.00621) (0.00610) 
Number of Children     -0.0100*** -0.00797*** 
     (0.00264) (0.00261) 
Business course    -0.0359*** -0.0370*** 
     (0.00768) (0.00750) 
Year fixed effect yes  yes  yes 
Cons 0.183*** 0.118 0.0717 0.231** 0.762*** 0.759*** 
 (0.00408) (0.0782) (0.0462) (0.0919) (0.0571) (0.0967) 
N 15810 15810 15810 15810 15522 15522 
R2 0.009 0.036 0.023 0.059 0.064 0.095 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 






Table 2. 5 The impact of ancillary service on the monthly payment, client fixed effect 
  Whole sample High score (620) Low score (620) High score (640) Low score (640) High score (680) Low score (680) 
Training hours  -0.00106 -0.00967*** -0.00111 -0.0117*** -0.000420 -0.00601* -0.00100 
 (0.00407) (0.00339) (0.00484) (0.00362) (0.00434) (0.00340) (0.00393) 
Consulting hours  0.0000876 -0.000821** 0.00159** -0.000825** 0.00160** -0.000923** 0.00109* 
 (0.000725) (0.000394) (0.000698) (0.000387) (0.000662) (0.000365) (0.000565) 
Default ratio 0.0626 -0.000457 0.0836*** -0.0309 0.105*** -0.0343 0.0710*** 
 (0.0585) (0.0228) (0.0304) (0.0229) (0.0287) (0.0282) (0.0235) 
Loan interest rate 1.154* 0.739*** 1.264*** 0.499** 1.224*** 0.857*** 1.151*** 
 (0.638) (0.235) (0.251) (0.254) (0.233) (0.268) (0.209) 
Age 0.0904** 0.00825 0.135*** -0.0149 0.126*** -0.00266 0.113*** 
 (0.0356) (0.0147) (0.0211) (0.0160) (0.0186) (0.0162) (0.0163) 
Age_square -0.000538 0.000509*** -0.000987*** 0.000760*** -0.000898*** 0.000442*** -0.000753*** 
 (0.000429) (0.000138) (0.000165) (0.000151) (0.000143) (0.000150) (0.000129) 
Year fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Client fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
_cons -2.781*** -1.489*** -3.665*** -0.983** -3.434*** -0.871** -3.251*** 
 (0.757) (0.375) (0.616) (0.401) (0.551) (0.423) (0.455) 
N 15810 8688 7122 7491 8319 5000 10810 
R2 0.049 0.070 0.054 0.065 0.058 0.051 0.054 
Standard errors in parentheses 









Table 2. 6 Means and standard deviations of ancillary service hours after the monthly payment 
  
One month  
on-time payment 
 One month  
missed payment 
 Two months  
missed payment 
  Obs Mean Sd  Obs Mean Sd  Obs Mean Sd 
One month consulting 12893 0.39 1.33  2377 0.21 0.75  1320 0.16 0.66 
Three month average consulting  11873 0.38 0.99  2330 0.18 0.52  1311 0.16 0.47 
One month training 12893 0.03 0.34  2377 0.01 0.18  1320 0 0 
Three month average training  11873 0.02 0.21  2330 0.01 0.09  1311 0 0.07 




Table 2. 7 The impact of ancillary service after the last missed-payment on monthly payment 
 OLS  Client fixed effect Client fixed effect Client fixed effect 
 Whole sample  Whole sample High score (620) Low score (620) 
Training hours -0.00323***  -0.00200 0.00128 -0.00399*** 
 (0.000319)  (0.00189) (0.00130) (0.00134) 
Consulting hours -0.00322***  -0.00311*** -0.00345*** -0.00278*** 
 (0.000140)  (0.000676) (0.000269) (0.000540) 
Default ratio 0.110***  -0.252*** -0.186** -0.346** 
 (0.0109)  (0.0968) (0.0858) (0.154) 
Loan interest rate -0.491***  0.840** 0.698 1.239 
 (0.115)  (0.394) (0.765) (1.039) 
Age 0.00593***  0.0464 -0.0284* 0.123*** 
 (0.00211)  (0.0302) (0.0162) (0.0240) 
Age_square -0.0000542**  0.000180 0.000976*** -0.000521** 
 (0.0000237)  (0.000348) (0.000163) (0.000218) 
Credit score -0.000511***     
 (0.0000347)     
Edu years -0.0138***     
 (0.00152)     
Edu college more 0.0798***     
 (0.00911)     
Gender 0.0216***     
 (0.00613)     
Married -0.0309***     
 (0.00601)     
Number of children -0.0122***     
 (0.00258)     
Business course -0.0219***     
 (0.00747)     
Year fixed effect Yes     
Cons 0.513***  -2.367*** -0.859** -4.092*** 
 (0.0960)  (0.679) (0.402) (0.660) 
N 15522  15810 8688 7122 
R2 0.125  0.061 0.085 0.057 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01  




Table 2. 8 OLS regressions of the impact of ancillary service on MissedPaymentRate 
  All High Low 
Training hours  0.000692 -0.000551 0.00168 
 (0.000819) (0.000509) (0.00128) 
Consulting hours -0.00103*** -0.000902*** -0.00118** 
 (0.000238) (0.000207) (0.000501) 
GDP growth rate -0.0107* -0.0167** -0.00499 
 (0.00579) (0.00702) (0.0103) 
GDP growth rate next year -0.0424*** -0.0545*** -0.0365*** 
 (0.00674) (0.0112) (0.00946) 
Default ratio 0.0538** 0.0304 0.0734* 
 (0.0229) (0.0249) (0.0406) 
Loan interest rate -0.144 0.219 -0.269 
 (0.274) (0.351) (0.400) 
Age  -0.000148 -0.0000291 0.000529 
 (0.00398) (0.00387) (0.00905) 
Age_squre 0.0000166 0.0000176 0.000000944 
 (0.0000453) (0.0000443) (0.000107) 
Credit score  -0.000595*** -0.000602*** -0.000564* 
 (0.0000844) (0.000151) (0.000289) 
Education year -0.00369 0.0000619 -0.00921 
 (0.00380) (0.00371) (0.00854) 
Edu_college and more 0.0619*** 0.0232 0.110** 
 (0.0226) (0.0237) (0.0435) 
Gender 0.0213 0.0169 0.0262 
 (0.0157) (0.0174) (0.0321) 
Married -0.0340** -0.0139 -0.0488 
 (0.0147) (0.0160) (0.0318) 
Business courses -0.0238 0.00658 -0.0641* 
 (0.0176) (0.0169) (0.0368) 
_cons 0.656*** 0.605*** 0.706** 
 (0.116) (0.142) (0.290) 
N 731 420 311 
R2 0.239 0.264 0.161 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01  




Table 2. 9 Margins of Probit regressions of the impact of ancillary service on MissedThreePayments 
  All High Low 
Training hours  -0.000430 -0.00384 0.00107 
 (0.00165) (0.00243) (0.00260) 
Consulting hours -0.00304*** -0.00306*** -0.00306*** 
 (0.000641) (0.000803) (0.000991) 
GDP growth rate -0.0351*** -0.0326*** -0.0375** 
 (0.0101) (0.0103) (0.0182) 
GDP growth rate next year -0.0620*** -0.0604*** -0.0570*** 
 (0.0109) (0.0167) (0.0163) 
Default ratio 0.0237 -0.0165 0.0432 
 (0.0409) (0.0480) (0.0707) 
Loan interest rate -1.100** 0.271 -2.445*** 
 (0.515) (0.773) (0.753) 
Age  -0.00106 0.0123 -0.0301* 
 (0.00885) (0.00993) (0.0179) 
Age_squre 3.49e-05 -0.000117 0.000389* 
 (9.99e-05) (0.000108) (0.000213) 
Credit score  -0.00101*** -0.00103*** -0.000116 
 (0.000188) (0.000373) (0.000625) 
Education year -0.00451 0.00417 -0.00913 
 (0.00824) (0.00920) (0.0154) 
Edu_college and more 0.0888* -0.0396 0.211*** 
 (0.0503) (0.0605) (0.0795) 
Gender 0.0356 0.0509 -0.0193 
 (0.0328) (0.0361) (0.0592) 
Married -0.0378 -0.00535 -0.0460 
 (0.0315) (0.0357) (0.0576) 
Business courses -0.0768** 0.0233 -0.199*** 
 (0.0368) (0.0375) (0.0703) 
N 731 420 311 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
  






Table 2. 10 IV regressions of the impact of ancillary service on MissedPaymentRate 
  All   High   Low 
  Second stage First stage First stage  Second stage First stage First stage  Second stage First stage First stage 
    Training Consulting     Training Consulting     Training Consulting 
Training hours  0.0105* .   0.0136**    0.00752   
 (0.00568) .   (0.00663)    (0.0182)   
Consulting hours -0.00203** .   -0.00198***    -0.00170   
 (0.000890) .   (0.000660)    (0.00558)   
GDP growth rate -0.0126** 0.195 0.118  -0.0185*** 0.0453 0.115  -0.00645 0.448 -0.0738 
 (0.00556) (0.219) (0.676)  (0.00669) (0.258) (0.863)  (0.0121) (0.380) (1.044) 
GDP growth rate next year -0.0387*** -0.348 0.899  -0.0567*** 0.257 3.013***  -0.0325** -0.818** -0.696 
 (0.00616) (0.231) (0.711)  (0.00869) (0.326) (1.092)  (0.0134) (0.351) (0.963) 
Default ratio 0.0588*** 0.528 10.84***  0.00233 2.445** 13.64***  0.0884 -1.479 7.606* 
 (0.0226) (0.868) (2.679)  (0.0328) (1.059) (3.543)  (0.0808) (1.462) (4.013) 
Loan interest rate 0.0484 -32.29*** -175.8***  0.283 -19.55 -209.7***  -0.128 -36.82** -123.3*** 
 (0.320) (10.81) (33.35)  (0.422) (14.49) (48.49)  (0.468) (16.66) (45.73) 
Age  0.00141 -0.104 1.653***  0.00423 -0.0790 2.666***  -0.00654 0.161 -1.418 
 (0.00510) (0.188) (0.580)  (0.00580) (0.205) (0.686)  (0.0146) (0.413) (1.132) 
Age_squre -0.00000256 0.00159 -0.0188***  -0.0000372 0.00141 -0.0299***  0.0000961 -0.00216 0.0170 
 (0.0000595) (0.00217) (0.00670)  (0.0000657) (0.00229) (0.00768)  (0.000181) (0.00504) (0.0138) 
Credit score  -0.000490*** -0.00372 0.0710***  -0.000618*** 0.00708 0.0932***  -0.000343 -0.0285** 0.00839 
 (0.000121) (0.00377) (0.0116)  (0.000209) (0.00772) (0.0259)  (0.000636) (0.0127) (0.0349) 
Education year -0.00161 -0.173 0.429  0.00217 -0.164 0.547  -0.00676 -0.283 0.796 
 (0.00432) (0.165) (0.509)  (0.00489) (0.186) (0.624)  (0.0132) (0.316) (0.867) 
Edu_college and more 0.0487* 1.121 -3.145  -0.00276 1.917 -4.371  0.100** 0.701 -1.816 
 (0.0268) (1.019) (3.143)  (0.0347) (1.281) (4.288)  (0.0500) (1.704) (4.676) 
Gender 0.0405** -1.692*** 3.870*  0.0422* -1.370* 3.199  0.0358 -2.471** 7.595** 
 (0.0203) (0.653) (2.015)  (0.0227) (0.758) (2.536)  (0.0896) (1.230) (3.375) 
Married -0.0301* -0.401 -0.266  -0.0167 0.483 -0.0993  -0.0439 -1.011 0.111 
 (0.0158) (0.628) (1.939)  (0.0187) (0.727) (2.435)  (0.0336) (1.183) (3.248) 
Business courses -0.0257 0.937 6.599***  -0.00834 1.814** 13.24***  -0.0541 -1.420 -4.452 
 (0.0204) (0.799) (2.466)  (0.0269) (0.898) (3.005)  (0.0374) (1.516) (4.163) 
Distance  -0.943*** 1.153   -1.016*** 2.069**   -0.599 0.0883 
  (0.247) (0.761)   (0.283) (0.948)   (0.468) (1.286) 
Membership years  0.643*** 5.337***   0.384** 7.138***   0.992*** 3.407*** 
  (0.138) (0.425)   (0.177) (0.594)   (0.219) (0.602) 
_cons 0.510*** 11.26** -74.89***  0.539*** -0.426 -128.0***  0.635 24.38** 32.45 
 (0.164) (5.029) (15.51)  (0.198) (7.341) (24.57)  (0.396) (11.70) (32.12) 
R2 0.085    -0.071    0.111   






Endogeneity Test                       
Durbin (score)  chi2(2) 6.83049    8.55044    0.235017   
 p 0.0329    0.0139    0.8891   
Wu-Hausman  F 3.30567    4.06274    0.106181   
 p 0.0372    0.0179    0.8993   
Robust score chi2(2) 5.46143    7.47694    0.222665   
 p 0.0652    0.0238    0.8946   
Robust regression F 2.78298    3.98261    0.100895   
 p 0.0625    0.0194    0.9041   
             
Weak IV Test            
Minimum eigenvalue statistic 8.6    7.59    0.51   
Critical values (10%) 7.03    7.03    7.03   
Anderson-Rubin  
Wald test 
F 3.09    7.25    0.14   
 p 0.046    0.0008    0.8714   
Anderson-Rubin  
Wald test  
Chi-sq(2) 6.31    15.04    0.29   
 p 0.0426    0.0005    0.8653   
Stock-Wright  
LM S statistic  
Chi-sq(2) 6.26     14.52    0.29   
 p 0.0438    0.0007    0.8654   
N 729 729 729   420 420 420   309 309 309 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
  






Table 2. 11 Probit IV regressions of the impact of ancillary service on MissedThreePayments 
  All   High   Low 
 Second stage First stage First stage  Second stage First stage First stage  Second stage First stage First stage 
    Training Consulting     Training Consulting     Training Consulting 
Training hours  0.0803*    0.0360    0.182   
 (0.0448)    (0.0584)    (0.191)   
Consulting hours -0.0112    -0.0127*    -0.0424   
 (0.00729)    (0.00682)    (0.0587)   
GDP growth rate -0.146*** 0.448 -0.0738  -0.160*** 0.448 -0.0738  -0.183 0.448 -0.0738 
 (0.0421) (0.380) (1.044)  (0.0529) (0.380) (1.044)  (0.127) (0.380) (1.044) 
GDP growth rate next year -0.201*** -0.818** -0.696  -0.301*** -0.818** -0.696  -0.0625 -0.818** -0.696 
 (0.0473) (0.351) (0.963)  (0.0719) (0.351) (0.963)  (0.141) (0.351) (0.963) 
Default ratio 0.0427 -1.479 7.606*  -0.258 -1.479 7.606*  0.712 -1.479 7.606* 
 (0.182) (1.462) (4.013)  (0.308) (1.462) (4.013)  (0.846) (1.462) (4.013) 
Loan interest rate -0.339 -36.82** -123.3***  2.666 -36.82** -123.3***  -3.432 -36.82** -123.3*** 
 (2.485) (16.66) (45.73)  (3.716) (16.66) (45.73)  (4.911) (16.66) (45.73) 
Age  0.0107 0.161 -1.418  0.0564 0.161 -1.418  -0.150 0.161 -1.418 
 (0.0411) (0.413) (1.132)  (0.0530) (0.413) (1.132)  (0.154) (0.413) (1.132) 
Age_squre -0.0000714 -0.00216 0.0170  -0.000555 -0.00216 0.0170  0.00194 -0.00216 0.0170 
 (0.000480) (0.00504) (0.0138)  (0.000600) (0.00504) (0.0138)  (0.00191) (0.00504) (0.0138) 
Credit score  -0.00323*** -0.0285** 0.00839  -0.00530*** -0.0285** 0.00839  0.00498 -0.0285** 0.00839 
 (0.000985) (0.0127) (0.0349)  (0.00198) (0.0127) (0.0349)  (0.00672) (0.0127) (0.0349) 
Education year 0.00395 -0.283 0.796  0.0247 -0.283 0.796  0.0659 -0.283 0.796 
 (0.0349) (0.316) (0.867)  (0.0452) (0.316) (0.867)  (0.139) (0.316) (0.867) 
Edu_college and more 0.205 0.701 -1.816  -0.240 0.701 -1.816  0.359 0.701 -1.816 
 (0.216) (1.704) (4.676)  (0.314) (1.704) (4.676)  (0.527) (1.704) (4.676) 
Gender 0.270* -2.471** 7.595**  0.318 -2.471** 7.595**  0.579 -2.471** 7.595** 
 (0.162) (1.230) (3.375)  (0.197) (1.230) (3.375)  (0.945) (1.230) (3.375) 
Married -0.0987 -1.011 0.111  -0.0455 -1.011 0.111  0.0383 -1.011 0.111 
 (0.125) (1.183) (3.248)  (0.166) (1.183) (3.248)  (0.351) (1.183) (3.248) 
Business courses -0.359** -1.420 -4.452  -0.0245 -1.420 -4.452  -0.466 -1.420 -4.452 
 (0.162) (1.516) (4.163)  (0.242) (1.516) (4.163)  (0.395) (1.516) (4.163) 
Distance . -0.599 0.0883   -0.599 0.0883   -0.599 0.0883 
 . (0.468) (1.286)   (0.468) (1.286)   (0.468) (1.286) 
Membership years . 0.992*** 3.407***   0.992*** 3.407***   0.992*** 3.407*** 
 . (0.219) (0.602)   (0.219) (0.602)   (0.219) (0.602) 






_cons 1.803 24.38** 32.45  2.110 24.38** 32.45  -0.629 24.38** 32.45 
 (1.313) (11.70) (32.12) 
 (1.808) (11.70) (32.12)  (4.180) (11.70) (32.12) 
  
           
Endogeneity Test                       
Wald test of exogeneity chi2(2) 8.53     
 1.3   7.32   
 p 0.01     
 0.52   0.0258   
Weak IV Test            
Anderson-Rubin test (AR) chi2(2) 4.02     3.5   3.78   
 p 0.1339     0.1738   0.1507   
F  5.1 19.99   3.25 19.64 
  3.8 4.9 
N   729 309 309   420 309 309   309 309 309 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 








Chapter 1 Appendices 
Table A1. 1 Maternity costs for female employees in China 
Three periods Length Cost involved 
Pregnancy Ten months 
Reduce work time and labor intensity; 
The prenatal examination time is included in the labor 
time. 
Overall cost of temporary replacement staff. 
Pregnant women's lounge. 
Maternity 98 days onward 
Maternity wage. 
Maternity subsidy and medical expenses for childbirth or 
abortion30. 
The overall cost of the temporary replacement staff. 
Breastfeeding 12 months 
One hour or more of breastfeeding time per day. 
Nursing room. 
Reduce work time and labor intensity 
Source: The Special Rules on the Labor Protection of Female Employees (2012) 
  
 
30 For female employees who do not participate in maternity insurance. 




Table A1. 2 Estimate the policy effect on the new childbirth (0 to 1-year-old) by pooled data 
Dependent variable Second child Any child 
One single-child parent 0.000803 -0.0406 
 (0.0294) (0.0319) 
Neither single-child parent -0.00356 -0.0734** 
 (0.0309) (0.0343) 
Year 2014 0.00292 -0.00800 
 (0.0143) (0.0162) 
Year 2016 0.0272 0.0113 
 (0.0288) (0.0324) 
Two-child policy -0.0155 0.264*** 
 (0.0274) (0.0424) 
Two-child policy*child before two-child policy -0.345*** 
  (0.0329) 
Linear combinations of parameters   
Policy effect on the second child  -0.081** 
  (0.031) 
Control variables   
Age 0.667*** 0.163 
 (0.221) (0.279) 
Age groups (3 years) Yes Yes 
Age*age groups (3 years) Yes Yes 
Edu years 0.000312 0.00229 
 (0.00272) (0.00309) 
Edu years*collegesome -0.00292** -0.000284 
 (0.00120) (0.00144) 
52 to 69 years old family member (dummy) 0.0274* 0.0248 
 (0.0143) (0.0155) 
Family income (yuan) -4.69e-09 -4.92e-08 
 (7.43e-08) (8.43e-08) 
Location_rural  0.0601*** 0.0369** 
 (0.0137) (0.0153) 
First child gender (boy=1) -0.0479*** -0.0458*** 
 (0.0123) (0.0136) 
Cons -12.63*** -2.439 
 (4.193) (5.518) 
N 2418 2618 
Adj. R2 0.102 0.241 
Note: Sample is married women, 18 to 42 years old. 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
  




Table A1. 3 Gender of the newborn first child before and after the two-child policy 
   Obs Mean 
First child boy 
Before policy 176 0.61 
After policy 87 0.55 
Pairwise comparisons of means with equal variances 
Contrast -0.056 
Std. Err. 0.0646 
Unadjusted 95% conf. Interval [-0.1834, 0.071] 
  




Table A1. 4 Median regression of the extent of labor participation of married women, 18 to 42 years old 
  Recent Usual Days/Month   Recent Usual Hours/Week 
Variable Zero Child One Child Two Children  Zero Child One Child Two Children 
Wage (1000 yuan/day) -3.934 -9.634*** -14.30  16.97 -2.341* -2.157 
 (6.695) (1.722) (27.91)  (26.44) (1.268) (60.51) 
Wage square 3.324 3.873 1.826  -9.606 1.171 -1.443 
 (10.09) (3.896) (36.34)  (46.51) (0.824) (67.77) 
Edu years -0.334** -0.222*** -0.0802  -0.984** -0.339*** 0.0119 
 (0.155) (0.0399) (0.111)  (0.482) (0.0807) (0.350) 
Collegesome -1.291 -1.519*** -2.263**  -1.976 -5.636*** -8.540*** 
 (1.172) (0.276) (0.914)  (3.019) (0.815) (2.466) 
Age 0.300 0.128 0.509  -0.329 0.0560 -0.147 
 (0.736) (0.149) (0.427)  (2.095) (0.599) (1.874) 
Age_sq -0.00415 -0.00267 -0.00849  0.00641 -0.00222 -0.00154 
 (0.0120) (0.00223) (0.00655)  (0.0337) (0.00850) (0.0279) 
Health -0.147 -0.120 -0.310  -0.425 -0.396** -1.324 
 (0.349) (0.0791) (0.238)  (1.058) (0.193) (0.811) 
Family income 0.140 -0.0443 0.537  -0.279 -0.0627 0.135 
 (0.295) (0.0734) (0.330)  (0.686) (0.190) (1.025) 
Preschool children -1.211 -0.625*** -0.0645  -2.459 -0.470 -1.468 
 (2.669) (0.155) (0.280)  (5.826) (0.403) (1.061) 
Location_rural 0.687* 0.849*** -0.300  1.882 0.534 -2.430 
 (0.407) (0.172) (0.546)  (2.233) (0.905) (1.717) 
Year2014 0.00347 0.336** -0.387  1.994 -0.0474 -3.426* 
 (1.441) (0.164) (0.606)  (2.763) (0.414) (1.760) 
Year2016 -0.882 0.133 -0.562  -3.512 -0.925* -5.625** 
 (0.974) (0.230) (0.721)  (2.906) (0.520) (2.531) 
Year2016-Year2014 -0.89 -0.203 -0.17  -5.51 -0.88** -2.20 
  (1.58) (0.192) (0.56)  (3.80) (0.425) (2.51) 
Cons 23.48** 28.30*** 17.06**  65.21* 54.60*** 64.90* 
 (11.19) (2.542) (7.930)  (33.24) (10.41) (36.41) 
N 186 1771 1185   186 1771 1184 
Note: Sample is women who worked last year. 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.




Table A1. 5 Linear probability estimation of female labor participation of married women, 18 to 38 years old 
  Zero child One child Two children 
Wage (1000 yuan/day) -0.0106 0.00583 -0.00926 
 (0.0864) (0.0212) (0.0264) 
Wage square -0.0163 -0.0581*** -0.0530*** 
 (0.0320) (0.00956) (0.0120) 
Years of edu -0.00939 0.00115 0.00158 
 (0.0120) (0.00290) (0.00240) 
College 0.154* 0.0615*** 0.0448* 
 (0.0801) (0.0201) (0.0259) 
Age 0.0446 0.0490** -0.0282 
 (0.0632) (0.0219) (0.0224) 
Age_sq -0.000605 -0.000774** 0.000506 
 (0.00102) (0.000346) (0.000359) 
Health -0.000282 0.00560 -0.0202** 
 (0.0190) (0.00737) (0.00919) 
Family member income -0.0146 -0.0109* -0.0213*** 
 (0.0210) (0.00657) (0.00784) 
Fchildage_0to5 0.0288 -0.0571*** -0.0287** 
 (0.0308) (0.0152) (0.0143) 
Location_rural -0.0436 0.0117 -0.0268 
 (0.0455) (0.0135) (0.0182) 
Year2014 0.147*** 0.184*** 0.256*** 
 (0.0434) (0.0158) (0.0276) 
Year2016 0.109** 0.185*** 0.212*** 
 (0.0521) (0.0215) (0.0290) 
Year2016-year2014 -0.038 0.002 -0.044** 
  (0.044) (0.014) (0.017) 
_cons 0.308 0.139 1.449*** 
 (0.976) (0.349) (0.358) 
N 179 1439 855 
Adj. R2 0.099 0.390 0.367 
Notes: These estimates use the imputed wage for women that did not work in the previous year.  
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01




Table A1. 6 OLS estimation of the extent of labor participation of married women, 18 to 38 years old 
  Recent usual days/month   Recent usual hours/week 
Variable Zero child One child Two children  Zero child One child Two children 
Wage (1000 yuan/day) -7.127 -13.95*** -8.778**  31.64 -3.352 -4.939 
 (6.780) (2.744) (3.460)  (24.46) (6.133) (7.047) 
Wage square 4.978 4.391** 0.827  -32.52 1.081 -0.846 
 (8.167) (1.922) (0.668)  (30.39) (3.102) (1.431) 
Years of edu -0.395*** -0.0226 -0.00301  -1.315** -0.576* 0.228 
 (0.142) (0.0828) (0.0888)  (0.637) (0.304) (0.292) 
College 0.130 -1.174** -0.713  -0.407 -4.720*** -4.585 
 (1.015) (0.539) (0.940)  (3.648) (1.773) (3.430) 
Age 0.640 0.492 1.511  1.756 -0.596 2.722 
 (0.854) (0.623) (0.996)  (3.254) (2.013) (2.517) 
Age_sq -0.00937 -0.00814 -0.0268*  -0.0266 0.00591 -0.0523 
 (0.0142) (0.00986) (0.0158)  (0.0551) (0.0316) (0.0407) 
Health 0.113 -0.158 -0.0187  0.758 -1.730*** -1.487 
 (0.386) (0.190) (0.299)  (1.319) (0.622) (1.031) 
Family income 0.357 0.0998 -0.0557  0.0938 -0.207 0.195 
 (0.296) (0.199) (0.277)  (1.291) (0.654) (0.966) 
Child age 0 to 5 -0.503 -0.877** -0.517  -4.046 -0.936 -2.772** 
 (2.567) (0.398) (0.423)  (5.492) (1.273) (1.228) 
Location_rural -0.352 -0.312 -1.413***  -0.484 -1.658 -2.120 
 (0.703) (0.352) (0.503)  (2.490) (1.176) (1.811) 
Year2014 -0.255 0.895** -0.644  0.484 -1.883 -2.306 
 (0.883) (0.355) (0.585)  (3.610) (1.226) (2.193) 
Year2016 -1.419 -0.231 -1.143  -3.244 -5.441*** -7.780*** 
 (1.163) (0.565) (0.779)  (4.119) (1.854) (2.888) 
Year2016-year2014 -1.16 -1.13** -0.50  -3.73 -3.56** -5.47** 
  (1.33) (0.52) (0.81)  (4.82) (1.66) (2.73) 
Cons 15.93 18.38* 7.347  29.06 78.60** 22.43 
 (12.79) (9.908) (15.57)  (47.04) (31.98) (39.51) 
N 165 1290 760  165 1290 760 
Adj. R2 0.130 0.112 0.051   0.061 0.062 0.018 
Note: Sample is women who worked last year. 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
  






Chapter 2 Appendices 
Table A2. 1 Statistical summary of characteristics for service participants and non-participants (disaggregated performance) 
 Whole sample Only training Only consulting 
Both training and 
consulting 
Training or consulting 
Neither training or 
consulting 
 mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd 
MissedMonthlyPayment a 0.16 0.36 0.15 0.36 0.14 0.35 0.15 0.36 0.15 0.35 0.20 0.40 
Training hours c 2.87 8.29 8.22 14.02   8.99 12.12 3.52 9.06   
Consulting hours d 21.79 25.87   25.68 21.33 37.39 32.07 26.73 26.25   
Default ratio e 0.21 0.32 0.08 0.23 0.21 0.31 0.27 0.34 0.22 0.32 0.16 0.35 
Loan interest rate 0.07 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.10 0.03 
Household income f 2.14 1.75 1.45 1.04 2.41 2.00 1.76 1.23 2.12 1.76 2.24 1.68 
Education year 14.82 2.49 14.38 2.05 14.96 2.44 14.65 2.80 14.81 2.53 14.88 2.30 
College degree 0.76 0.42 0.70 0.46 0.81 0.39 0.70 0.46 0.77 0.42 0.75 0.43 
Gender 0.35 0.48 0.17 0.37 0.41 0.49 0.31 0.46 0.36 0.48 0.29 0.45 
Married 0.58 0.49 0.46 0.50 0.63 0.48 0.59 0.49 0.60 0.49 0.52 0.50 
Number of children 1.16 1.19 1.28 1.52 1.20 1.16 1.23 1.20 1.22 1.21 0.88 1.02 
Credit score g 633.74 85.26 605.93 74.63 650.30 84.02 628.80 85.68 639.49 84.93 608.42 82.03 
Business courses 0.80 0.40 0.93 0.26 0.81 0.39 0.82 0.38 0.83 0.38 0.68 0.47 
Business experience 3.19 5.07 2.07 2.58 3.57 5.32 3.19 4.13 3.31 4.79 2.67 6.12 
Age h 42.14 10.18 38.24 9.92 41.89 10.33 42.27 9.28 41.65 10.05 44.28 10.46 
Distance i 0.69 2.30 0.34 0.28 0.86 2.66 0.35 0.35 0.65 2.09 0.86 3.06 
Membership years j 3.08 2.42 3.05 1.87 2.67 1.91 4.49 3.13 3.26 2.48 2.31 1.93 
N 15441  1220  7555  3808  12583  2858  
  






Table A2. 2 Statistical summary of characteristics for service participants and non-participants (Aggregated performance) 
  Whole sample Only training Only consulting 
Both training and 
consulting 
Training or consulting 
Neither training or 
consulting 
  mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd 
MissedPaymentRate 
(%) a 
0.16 0.22 0.17 0.24 0.14 0.21 0.16 0.21 0.15 0.21 0.22 0.24 
MissedThreePayments 
b 
0.33 0.47 0.31 0.47 0.32 0.47 0.35 0.48 0.33 0.47 0.34 0.47 
Training hours c 3.09 8.43 6.68 12.86 0 0 9.11 12.11 3.72 9.12 0 0 
Consulting hours d 23.83 26.81 0.00 0.00 29.82 25.22 34.23 28.65 28.7 26.94 0 0 
Default ratio e 0.19 0.34 0.14 0.33 0.18 0.32 0.22 0.35 0.19 0.33 0.18 0.36 
Loan interest rate 0.08 0.03 0.10 0.02 0.07 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.1 0.02 
Household income f 2.16 1.77 1.84 1.22 2.37 2.01 1.84 1.48 2.14 1.8 2.24 1.61 
Education year 14.93 2.51 14.71 1.80 15.09 2.44 14.82 2.97 14.96 2.59 14.79 2.13 
College degree 0.79 0.41 0.78 0.42 0.82 0.38 0.74 0.44 0.79 0.41 0.78 0.42 
Gender 0.34 0.47 0.11 0.32 0.42 0.49 0.31 0.47 0.36 0.48 0.25 0.44 
Married 0.58 0.49 0.47 0.50 0.63 0.48 0.59 0.49 0.6 0.49 0.49 0.5 
Number of children 1.14 1.19 0.87 1.14 1.24 1.18 1.22 1.29 1.2 1.22 0.88 1.01 
Credit score g 635.72 85.23 619.64 77.34 655.22 81.85 621.95 90.01 640.64 85.86 611.64 78.08 
Business courses 0.80 0.40 0.93 0.25 0.79 0.41 0.82 0.39 0.81 0.39 0.77 0.42 
Business experience 3.00 4.88 1.60 2.22 3.55 5.23 2.86 4.09 3.14 4.69 2.32 5.66 
Age h 40.19 10.65 36.62 11.56 40.12 10.18 40 10.29 39.77 10.37 42.23 11.74 
Distance i 0.63 2.06 0.28 0.13 0.88 2.94 0.33 0.29 0.64 2.24 0.58 0.69 
Membership years j 3.24 2.13 3.14 1.62 2.96 1.37 4.5 2.9 3.5 2.17 1.98 1.35 
N 613   45   289   175   509   104   
 
  






Table A2. 3 Means and standard deviations of characteristics for High (>620) and Low(≤620) credit score 
  Monthly  Aggeragated 
 High credit score Low credit score  High credit score Low credit score 
  mean sd mean sd  mean sd mean sd 
MissedMonthlyPayment 0.10 0.29 0.23 0.42      
MissedPaymentRate (%)       0.11 0.19 0.23 0.24 
MissedThreePayments       0.24 0.43 0.44 0.50 
Training hours  2.33 6.94 3.53 9.67  2.43 6.88 3.92 10.00 
Consulting hours  25.62 26.92 17.05 23.67  26.02 25.99 21.06 27.61 
Default ratio  0.19 0.30 0.24 0.35  0.16 0.31 0.22 0.36 
Loan interest rate 0.07 0.03 0.07 0.04  0.08 0.03 0.07 0.03 
Household income  2.45 2.00 1.76 1.28  2.49 2.02 1.73 1.26 
Education year 15.29 2.46 14.25 2.40  15.40 2.47 14.34 2.44 
College degree 0.81 0.39 0.71 0.45  0.83 0.38 0.74 0.44 
Gender 0.33 0.47 0.37 0.48  0.36 0.48 0.32 0.47 
Married 0.60 0.49 0.57 0.50  0.60 0.49 0.56 0.50 
Number of children 1.09 1.21 1.24 1.15  1.06 1.25 1.25 1.11 
Credit score 698.00 47.46 554.32 45.35  699.43 47.82 555.32 44.13 
Business courses 0.77 0.42 0.83 0.37  0.77 0.42 0.84 0.37 
Business experience 3.12 5.09 3.28 5.05  2.84 4.90 3.21 4.85 
Age  41.81 10.15 42.54 10.20  40.89 11.17 39.31 9.90 
Distance  0.88 3.05 0.46 0.50  0.75 2.70 0.48 0.61 
Membership years  2.83 2.28 3.40 2.54  3.05 1.79 3.50 2.47 
N 8535  6906   420  310  
  






Table A2. 4 Monthly payment and ancillary service, OLS, linear terms 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Training hours  0.00132*** 0.00107*** 0.00122*** 0.000754** 0.000479 0.000207 
 (0.000381) (0.000370) (0.000387) (0.000374) (0.000369) (0.000360) 
Consulting hours  -0.00129*** -0.000344** -0.00159*** -0.000270** -0.000767*** 0.000160 
 (0.000117) (0.000136) (0.000121) (0.000134) (0.000119) (0.000130) 
Default ratio   0.0944*** 0.140*** 0.0538*** 0.0943*** 
   (0.0105) (0.0110) (0.0107) (0.0112) 
Loan interest rate   -0.490*** -0.984*** -0.314*** -0.647*** 
   (0.106) (0.117) (0.106) (0.118) 
Age   0.00386* -0.00102 0.00363* 0.000745 
   (0.00215) (0.00212) (0.00218) (0.00215) 
Age_square   -0.0000161 0.0000359 -0.0000237 0.00000614 
   (0.0000241) (0.0000238) (0.0000246) (0.0000242) 
Credit score      -0.000765*** -0.000673*** 
     (0.0000346) (0.0000354) 
Edu years     -0.0159*** -0.0160*** 
     (0.00158) (0.00155) 
Edu college more     0.0970*** 0.0937*** 
     (0.00938) (0.00929) 
Gender     0.0204*** 0.0351*** 
     (0.00629) (0.00624) 
Married     -0.0215*** -0.0296*** 
     (0.00623) (0.00613) 
Housechild     -0.0100*** -0.00794*** 
     (0.00265) (0.00262) 
Business course     -0.0358*** -0.0370*** 
     (0.00771) (0.00753) 
Year fixed effect  yes  yes  yes 
Cons 0.183*** 0.118 0.0732 0.232** 0.767*** 0.765*** 
 (0.00410) (0.0782) (0.0464) (0.0920) (0.0574) (0.0969) 
N 15732 15732 15732 15732 15445 15445 
R2 0.009 0.036 0.023 0.059 0.065 0.094 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
  






Table A2. 5 Monthly payment and ancillary service, OLS, linear terms, client fixed effect 
  Whole sample High score (620) Low score (620) High score (640) Low score (640) High score (680) Low score (680) 
Training hours  -0.00119 -0.0112*** -0.00115 -0.0117*** -0.000574 -0.00606* -0.00116 
 (0.00434) (0.00366) (0.00485) (0.00364) (0.00459) (0.00342) (0.00413) 
Consulting hours  0.000105 -0.000775* 0.00159** -0.000827** 0.00160** -0.000927** 0.00109* 
 (0.000734) (0.000402) (0.000701) (0.000392) (0.000668) (0.000371) (0.000570) 
Default ratio 0.0630 -0.000589 0.0844*** -0.0312 0.106*** -0.0351 0.0714*** 
 (0.0589) (0.0229) (0.0305) (0.0231) (0.0289) (0.0287) (0.0236) 
Loan interest rate 1.157* 0.747*** 1.261*** 0.504** 1.221*** 0.862*** 1.150*** 
 (0.639) (0.237) (0.252) (0.256) (0.233) (0.269) (0.210) 
Age 0.0913** 0.00830 0.136*** -0.0151 0.126*** -0.00323 0.114*** 
 (0.0358) (0.0148) (0.0212) (0.0161) (0.0187) (0.0163) (0.0163) 
Age_square -0.000541 0.000515*** -0.000988*** 0.000768*** -0.000899*** 0.000451*** -0.000757*** 
 (0.000431) (0.000139) (0.000165) (0.000153) (0.000144) (0.000152) (0.000130) 
Year fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Client fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
_cons -2.806*** -1.496*** -3.685*** -0.987** -3.453*** -0.863** -3.280*** 
 (0.761) (0.377) (0.618) (0.404) (0.553) (0.427) (0.457) 
N 15732 8635 7097 7442 8290 4967 10765 
R2 0.049 0.070 0.054 0.065 0.058 0.051 0.054 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table A2. 6 OLS regressions (MissedPaymentRate) 
  All High Low 
Training hours  0.000488 -0.000809 0.00133 
 (0.000902) (0.000678) (0.00136) 
Consulting hours -0.00128*** -0.00140*** -0.00115** 
 (0.000299) (0.000300) (0.000489) 
GDP growth rate -0.0104* -0.0155** -0.00507 
 (0.00576) (0.00696) (0.0104) 
GDP growth rate next year -0.0370*** -0.0493*** -0.0291*** 
 (0.00668) (0.0118) (0.00953) 
Default ratio 0.122*** 0.0760** 0.153*** 
 (0.0274) (0.0348) (0.0424) 
Loan interest rate -0.307 0.0493 -0.522 
 (0.286) (0.390) (0.398) 
Age  -0.000982 0.00383 -0.0115 
 (0.00440) (0.00471) (0.0101) 
Age_squre 0.0000290 -0.0000227 0.000154 
 (0.0000496) (0.0000520) (0.000124) 
Credit score  -0.000642*** -0.000681*** -0.000606** 
 (0.0000943) (0.000186) (0.000297) 
Education year -0.00668 0.00156 -0.0177* 
 (0.00446) (0.00480) (0.00904) 
Edu_college and more 0.0776*** 0.0221 0.145*** 
 (0.0258) (0.0288) (0.0494) 
Gender 0.0274 0.0302 0.0113 
 (0.0183) (0.0213) (0.0345) 
Married -0.0280* -0.00811 -0.0303 
 (0.0164) (0.0187) (0.0341) 
Business courses -0.0278 0.00413 -0.0560 
 (0.0193) (0.0186) (0.0391) 
_cons 0.741*** 0.565*** 1.049*** 
 (0.130) (0.172) (0.283) 
N 614 342 272 
R2 0.266 0.281 0.213 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
  
   
87 
 
Table A2. 7 Margins of Probit regressions (MissedThreePayments) 
  All High Low 
Training hours  -0.000856 -0.00639* 0.000493 
 (0.00191) (0.00349) (0.00269) 
Consulting hours -0.00298*** -0.00329*** -0.00291*** 
 (0.000693) (0.000928) (0.000984) 
GDP growth rate -0.0370*** -0.0349*** -0.0393** 
 (0.0108) (0.0116) (0.0186) 
GDP growth rate next year -0.0586*** -0.0579*** -0.0468*** 
 (0.0118) (0.0195) (0.0171) 
Default ratio 0.134*** 0.0773 0.170** 
 (0.0463) (0.0588) (0.0725) 
Loan interest rate -1.255** 0.0882 -2.840*** 
 (0.573) (0.880) (0.785) 
Age  -0.000104 0.0148 -0.0410* 
 (0.0100) (0.0120) (0.0218) 
Age_squre 1.45e-05 -0.000145 0.000511* 
 (0.000113) (0.000130) (0.000269) 
Credit score  -0.00106*** -0.00138*** -0.000428 
 (0.000210) (0.000458) (0.000658) 
Education year -0.00523 0.0109 -0.0203 
 (0.00952) (0.0117) (0.0164) 
Edu_college and more 0.0963* -0.0748 0.277*** 
 (0.0581) (0.0734) (0.0861) 
Gender 0.0444 0.0768* -0.0519 
 (0.0380) (0.0449) (0.0635) 
Married -0.0314 0.00246 -0.0220 
 (0.0358) (0.0430) (0.0617) 
Business courses -0.0880** 0.0211 -0.221*** 
 (0.0418) (0.0433) (0.0760) 
N 614 342 272 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
  






Table A2. 8 IV regressions (MissedPaymentRate) 
  All   High   Low 
  Second stage First stage First stage  Second stage First stage First stage  Second stage First stage First stage 
    Training Consulting     Training Consulting     Training Consulting 
Training hours  0.0134*    0.0214*    0.0101   
 (0.00767)    (0.0121)    (0.0199)   
Consulting hours -0.00292**    -0.00335**    -0.00250   
 (0.00148)    (0.00145)    (0.00571)   
GDP growth rate -0.0129** 0.177 -0.0361  -0.0172** -0.00278 -0.0115  -0.00855 0.476 -0.0933 
 (0.00616) (0.223) (0.650)  (0.00810) (0.247) (0.791)  (0.0133) (0.406) (1.076) 
GDP growth rate next year -0.0321*** -0.375 0.502  -0.0537*** 0.305 2.491**  -0.0237* -0.828** -0.892 
 (0.00706) (0.239) (0.695)  (0.0112) (0.326) (1.043)  (0.0140) (0.378) (1.003) 
Default ratio 0.126*** 0.490 7.378**  0.0262 2.539** 10.30***  0.173** -1.157 5.045 
 (0.0280) (1.019) (2.963)  (0.0502) (1.231) (3.942)  (0.0684) (1.693) (4.492) 
Loan interest rate -0.0874 -33.24*** -172.9***  -0.0638 -12.51 -200.0***  -0.289 -38.23** -123.4** 
 (0.385) (11.46) (33.33)  (0.572) (14.64) (46.89)  (0.532) (18.35) (48.68) 
Age  0.00241 -0.0585 1.777***  0.0139 -0.183 3.295***  -0.0163 0.270 -1.658 
 (0.00628) (0.203) (0.590)  (0.00950) (0.212) (0.680)  (0.0183) (0.476) (1.263) 
Age_squre -0.0000102 0.000895 -0.0193***  -0.000130 0.00201 -0.0354***  0.000215 -0.00329 0.0209 
 (0.0000719) (0.00233) (0.00677)  (0.000104) (0.00234) (0.00750)  (0.000230) (0.00587) (0.0156) 
Credit score  -0.000488*** -0.00413 0.0589***  -0.000822*** 0.0131 0.0891***  -0.000325 -0.0268* 0.0280 
 (0.000155) (0.00413) (0.0120)  (0.000300) (0.00822) (0.0263)  (0.000780) (0.0141) (0.0374) 
Education year -0.00495 -0.0531 0.435  -0.00240 0.199 0.782  -0.0137 -0.230 0.826 
 (0.00505) (0.185) (0.539)  (0.00699) (0.205) (0.657)  (0.0134) (0.351) (0.932) 
Edu_college and more 0.0693** 0.480 -1.051  0.0208 0.234 -2.537  0.136*** 0.562 0.285 
 (0.0309) (1.141) (3.319)  (0.0446) (1.368) (4.381)  (0.0486) (1.942) (5.151) 
Gender 0.0569** -1.526** 6.570***  0.0688** -1.107 6.028**  0.0420 -2.690* 8.565** 
 (0.0274) (0.724) (2.106)  (0.0331) (0.798) (2.555)  (0.105) (1.408) (3.736) 
Married -0.0210 -0.637 -0.827  -0.00304 -0.0866 -0.438  -0.0229 -1.139 -1.015 
 (0.0189) (0.688) (2.002)  (0.0249) (0.756) (2.423)  (0.0344) (1.330) (3.529) 
Business courses -0.0323 0.805 3.331  -0.0248 1.995** 9.996***  -0.0493 -1.660 -7.143 
 (0.0239) (0.882) (2.565)  (0.0365) (0.926) (2.966)  (0.0432) (1.765) (4.681) 
Distance . -0.906*** 0.407   -0.718** 1.390   -0.808 -0.580 
 . (0.276) (0.804)   (0.304) (0.972)   (0.542) (1.438) 
Membership years . 0.614*** 4.215***   0.501** 5.688***   0.858*** 3.303*** 
 . (0.160) (0.464)   (0.216) (0.692)   (0.243) (0.645) 
_cons 0.522** 10.14* -65.32***  0.539* -6.980 -138.3***  0.880** 21.81* 27.47 
 (0.205) (5.591) (16.27)  (0.281) (7.908) (25.33)  (0.435) (13.14) (34.86) 
R2 614 614 614  342 342 342  272 272 272 
  0.008    -0.344    0.072   






Endogeneity Test                       
Durbin (score)  chi2(2) 6.83049    8.55044    0.235017   
 p 0.0329    0.0139    0.8891   
Wu-Hausman  F 3.30567    4.06274    0.106181   
 p 0.0372    0.0179    0.8993   
Robust score chi2(2) 5.46143    7.47694    0.222665   
 p 0.0652    0.0238    0.8946   
Robust regression F 2.78298    3.98261    0.100895   
 p 0.0625    0.0194    0.9041   
             
Weak IV Test            
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic   5.22    3.59    0.46   
Critical values (15%) 4.58    4.58    4.58   
Anderson-Rubin  
Wald test 
F 2.65    5.03    0.15   
 p 0.0716    0.0071    0.86   
Anderson-Rubin  
Wald test  
Chi-sq(2) 5.43    10.52    0.32   
 p 0.0663    0.0052    0.85   
Stock-Wright  
LM S statistic  
Chi-sq(2) 5.38    10.2    0.32   
 p 0.0679    0.0061    0.85   
N 614 614 614   342 342 342   272 272 272 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table A2. 9 Probit IV regressions of the impact of ancillary service on MissedThreePayments 
  All   High   Low 
            
Training hours  0.0933*  0.0596  0.183 
 (0.0563)  (0.0874)  (0.204) 
Consulting hours -0.00971  -0.00853  -0.0369 
 (0.0110)  (0.0108)  (0.0587) 
GDP growth rate -0.142***  -0.152***  -0.192 
 (0.0445)  (0.0557)  (0.136) 
GDP growth rate next year -0.168***  -0.274***  -0.0320 
 (0.0515)  (0.0803)  (0.144) 
Default ratio 0.402*  0.0127  0.942 
 (0.209)  (0.373)  (0.704) 
Loan interest rate -0.0842  2.710  -3.929 
 (2.804)  (4.180)  (5.493) 
Age  -0.00112  0.0555  -0.225 
 (0.0470)  (0.0705)  (0.191) 
Age_squre 0.0000553  -0.000522  0.00284 
 (0.000541)  (0.000775)  (0.00239) 
Credit score  -0.00301***  -0.00700***  0.00448 
 (0.00116)  (0.00233)  (0.00802) 
Education year -0.00638  0.0248  0.0208 
 (0.0379)  (0.0527)  (0.138) 
Edu_college and more 0.257  -0.271  0.653 
 (0.232)  (0.336)  (0.504) 
Gender 0.264  0.391*  0.470 
 (0.203)  (0.237)  (1.080) 
Married -0.0547  0.0223  0.0830 
      
 (0.139)  (0.182)  (0.352) 
Business courses -0.366**  -0.128  -0.523 
 (0.178)  (0.273)  (0.450) 
Distance      
      
Membership years      
      
_cons 1.882  3.137  1.513 
 (1.533) 
 (2.116)  (4.506) 
  
     
Endogeneity Test           
Wald test of exogeneity chi2(2) 9.34   2.67  7.54 
 p 0.01   0.2638  0.023 
Weak IV Test      
Anderson-Rubin test (AR) chi2(2) 3.85  0.82  3.9 
 p 0.146  0.66  0.14 
F    
  
N   614   342   272 
Standard errors in parentheses 
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